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 1 
CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
For most of the history of international criminal law, there were essentially two 
conceivable options to prosecute perpetrators of crimes under international law. These 
were, on the one hand, international criminal tribunals, such as the international 
military tribunals in Nuremberg (IMT) and Tokyo (IMTFE), the international criminal 
tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR), and, more recently, 
the permanent International Criminal Court (ICC). On the other hand, prosecutions 
could take place before national courts.1  
However, since the end of the 1990s, so-called ‘hybrid’ courts (also called ‘mixed’ or 
‘internationalised’ courts)2, which combine international and national criminal justice 
in various ways, have increasingly been established to prosecute perpetrators of large-
scale atrocities. The proliferation of such courts is an ongoing development, as 
evidenced by the recent establishment of the internationalised Extraordinary African 
Chambers (EAC) in Senegal in 2013. This moreover indicates that, despite the 
creation of a permanent international criminal court with the ICC, hybrid courts are 
likely to be established in the future. 
Especially for this reason, this development deserves closer scrutiny and assessment, 
and has indeed been the subject of numerous publications in recent years. However, 
the substantial part of the scholarly debate thus far, has focused on practical issues. 
These include, in particular, the impact of hybrid courts on post-conflict societies, 
                                                
1 These two options can be referred to as ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ enforcement of international 
criminal law, respectively. See, e.g., Bassiouni MC International Criminal Law 3 ed Vol II 
(2008) 3; Werle G Principles of International Criminal Law 2 ed (2009) para 220. 
2 See, e.g., Cassese A International Criminal Law 2 ed (2008) 332-3. 
 
 
 
 
 2 
namely the perception of legitimacy, impartiality and ownership within the local 
population, as well as local capacity building. 3  
However, another significant issue in assessing this development is the impact of 
hybrid courts on international criminal law itself. The application of substantive 
international criminal law by hybrid courts may lead to two contrasting outcomes. 
One possibility is that hybrid courts affirm well-established rules of international 
criminal law, or further develop this area of law to a reasonable extent. This could 
result in hybrid courts having a consolidating and strengthening effect on international 
criminal law. However, another possibility is that hybrid courts deviate significantly 
from what can be considered established international criminal law. This could cause 
an adverse diversification of international criminal law, and thus its weakening.4 The 
same is true regarding the inclusion of substantive international criminal law in the 
legal bases of hybrid courts. 
Yet, while individual decisions by hybrid courts have certainly been discussed by 
scholars and dealt with in decisions by other international or internationalised courts, 
this question as such has not been a focus of debate in recent years.5  
                                                
3 See, e.g., Higonnet IR ‘Restructuring Hybrid Courts: Local Empowerment and National 
Criminal Justice Reform’ (2006) 23 Arizona Journal of International & Comparative Law 
347-435; Nouwen SMH ‘“Hybrid Courts” – The hybrid category of a new type of 
international crimes courts’ (2006) 2 Utrecht Law Review 190-214; Wierda M, Nassar H & 
Maalouf L ‘Early Reflections on Local Perceptions, Legitimacy and Legacy of the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon’ (2007) 5 Journal of International Criminal Justice 1065-81.  
4 See, e.g., Buergenthal T ‘Proliferation of International Tribunals: Is it Good or is it Bad?’ 
(2001) 14 Leiden Journal of International Law 267-75; Pocar F ‘The Proliferation of 
International Criminal Courts and Tribunals: A Necessity in the International Community’ 
(2002) 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice 304-8; Raub L ‘Positioning Hybrid 
Tribunals in International Criminal Justice’ (2009) 14 International Law and Politics 1013-
53; Benzing M & Bergsmo M ‘Some Tentative Remarks on the Relationship Between 
Internationalized Criminal Jurisdictions and the International Criminal Court’ in Romano 
CPR, Nollkaemper A & Kleffner JK (eds.) Internationalized Criminal Courts and Tribunals 
(2005) 410-11. 
5 For notable exceptions, see Breitegger A ‘Aktuelle Beiträge der internationalen Strafjustiz 
zur Entwicklung des humanitären Völkerrechts’ (2010) Zeitschrift für Internationale 
 
 
 
 
 3 
The aim of this study is to scrutinise, in particular, the legal bases of and decisions 
taken by various hybrid courts with regards to such consolidating or fragmenting 
effects on substantive international criminal law.   
The first section (Chapter 2), it will examine what is to be understood by the notion of 
a hybrid court. This will be followed by an analysis of the hybrid courts that have 
been established thus far. Furthermore, the advantages and reasons for which hybrid 
courts have been established in recent decades will be discussed, especially regarding 
their potential advantages as a transitional justice instrument. Moreover, 
disadvantages of hybrid courts and their deficiencies in the past will be addressed.  
Subsequently, the role of hybrid courts within the international legal system and their 
utility in the future will be discussed (Chapter 3). This will include, on the one hand, 
the scope of the jurisdiction of hybrid courts in relation to other national and 
international criminal courts, especially vis-à-vis the ICC. On the other hand, it will 
be addressed whether hybrid courts will – or should – be established in the future, 
given the creation of the permanent ICC as well as the shortcomings of hybrid courts 
in the past. 
Against this background, the impact of hybrid courts on the further development of 
international criminal law will be assessed in the third section of the paper 
(Chapter 4). In this regard, the discussion will focus on a representative selection of 
hybrid courts, namely the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
(STL). It will be discussed how their legal bases as well as their jurisprudence relate 
                                                                                                                                      
Strafrechtsdogmatik 712-25; Meisenberg S ‘Festigung, Fortentwicklung und Verbreitung: 
Der Beitrag des Sondergerichtshofs für Sierra Leone zum humanitären Völkerrecht’ (2004) 
Humanitäres Völkerrecht – Informationsschriften 175-80; Meisenberg S ‘Die Rechtsprechung 
des Sondergerichtshof für Sierra Leone und sein Beitrag zum humanitären Völkerrecht’ 
(2008) Humanitäres Völkerrecht – Informationsschriften 143-57. 
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to the previous state of international criminal law, and whether they constitute adverse 
diversifications or positive contributions to international criminal law.  
In a concluding section (Chapter 5), the results of the study will be analysed and 
possible correlations between the structural elements of hybrid courts and their impact 
on international criminal law will be discussed. Finally, further questions regarding 
the use of hybrid courts in the future will be addressed. 
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CHAPTER 2:  THE HYBRID CRIMINAL JUSTICE MODEL 
2.1  The notion of hybrid courts 
Hybrid courts are criminal courts that feature both international and national 
elements.6 They are often established by a post-conflict state in cooperation with the 
UN and seated in the state concerned, are typically composed of both international 
and national judges,7 and usually apply both international and national criminal law.8 
Yet, no hybrid court is like another. As will be discussed below,9 considerable 
differences exist between hybrid courts, in particular regarding the type and extent of 
their respective ‘internationalisation’.  
For the purposes of this paper, the term ‘hybrid courts’ is thus used broadly to 
describe criminal courts or chambers that feature international and national elements 
regarding their composition as well as their establishment or subject matter 
jurisdiction.10  
2.2  Existing and former hybrid courts 
In order to illustrate the variety of hybrid courts in more detail, existing and former 
hybrid courts will be analysed in the following, with particular attention to their 
respective international aspects, the circumstances leading to their establishment, and 
their structural particularities. 
 
                                                
6 Ambos K Internationales Strafrecht 3 ed (2011) 131; Cassese A International Criminal Law 
3 ed (2008) 332; Werle G (2009) para 76-7. 
7 In this study, mixed composition is considered a constitutive element of hybrid courts, thus 
excluding similar institutions such as the Iraqi Special Tribunal. See, similarly, Cassese A 
International Criminal Law 3 ed (2008) 332; Nouwen SMH (2006) 205. For a different 
classification, see, e.g., Ambos K Internationales Strafrecht 3 ed (2011) 136. 
8 See Ambos K Internationales Strafrecht 3 ed (2011) 131, 138-40; Werle G (2009) paras 76-
8, 284-91. 
9 See below 10-11. 
10 See, similarly, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Rule-of-
law-tools for post-conflict states – maximizing the legacy of hybrid courts (2008) 1. 
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2.2.1  Regulation 64 Panels (Kosovo) 
In the late 1990s, while the ICTY focused on prosecuting perpetrators most 
responsible for the atrocities committed during the Yugoslav wars, numerous lower 
ranking suspects were detained in prisons in Kosovo. However, the domestic judicial 
system lacked the capacity and independence to appropriately conduct trials. For 
these reasons, the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) issued a series of regulations that 
provided for the participation of international judges and prosecutors in domestic 
trials.11 These so-called Regulation 64 Panels, named after UNMIK Regulation 
2000/64, have been deployed in trials concerning serious crimes on a case-by-case 
basis. International members are appointed by the Special Representative for 
UNMIK. The involvement of international personnel is the only international aspect 
of these panels, though UNMIK Regulation 2000/64 provided for a majority of 
international judges within the panels.12 The panels only apply domestic law, which 
however includes crimes under international law.13 Moreover, domestic law that 
conflicts with international law cannot be applied.14 The Regulation 64 Panels are 
funded through the UNMIK budget.15 
2.2.2  Special Panels of the Dili District Court (East Timor) 
In the aftermath of the armed conflict following the overthrow of the Suharto 
government in 1998, the situation in East Timor was similar to that in Kosovo. Here, 
                                                
11 UNMIK Regulation 2000/6 of 15 February 2000 as amended by UNMIK Regulation 
2000/34 of 27 May 2000 and UNMIK Regulation 2001/2 of 12 January 2001; UNMIK 
Regulation 2000/64 of 15 December 2000. The regulations are available at 
http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations (accessed 25 October 2013). Due to the position of 
UNMIK as the interim legislative authority, the panels were essentially created domestically; 
see Nouwen SMH (2006) 200. 
12 See s 2(1)(c) UNMIK Regulation 64. 
13 Werle G (2009) para 291, however noting that the applicable domestic law does not contain 
provisions on crimes against humanity and superior responsibility.  
14 Dickinson LA ‘The Promise of Hybrid Courts’ (2003) 97 American Journal of 
International Law 297. 
15 See Raub L (2009) 1024, 1029. 
 
 
 
 
 7 
too, the domestic judicial system was incapable of conducting trials of the numerous 
suspects in custody, mostly due to a substantial destruction of the infrastructure and 
lack of qualified personnel in East Timor. 16  In 2000, the UN Transitional 
Administration for East Timor (UNTAET) established the Special Panels for Serious 
Crimes (SPSC), integrated into the District Court of Dili, to try cases related to the 
conflict.17 The SPSC were operational until 2005. They had exclusive jurisdiction 
over genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, as well as serious criminal 
offences under the law of East Timor committed between January and October 
1999.18 Uniquely, the SPSC moreover claimed universal jurisdiction.19 International 
judges formed the majority in the SPSC’s chambers.20 Like the Regulation 64 Panels, 
the SPSC were funded through the UN mission budget.21 
2.2.3  Special Court for Sierra Leone 
In January 2002, following an appeal for international assistance by Sierra Leone, the 
UN and the government of Sierra Leone established the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone (SCSL) in order to account for atrocities committed during the Sierra Leonean 
civil war.22 The SCSL has jurisdiction over crimes against humanity, war crimes and 
certain crimes under Sierra Leonean law committed from 30 November 1996 until 
                                                
16 Raub L (2009) 1036. 
17 UNTAET Regulation 2000/15 of 6 June 2000, available at http://www.un.org/en/ 
peacekeeping/missions/past/etimor/untaetR (accessed 25 October 2013). Similarly to the 
Regulation 64 Panels, the SPSC were established by UNTAET and thus domestically. See 
above 5 n 11; Nouwen SMH (2006) 200. 
18 See s 2 UNTAET Regulation 2000/15. 
19 See ss 2.1, 2.2, 4-7 UNTAET Regulation 2000/15. See also Nouwen SMH (2006) 207. 
20 See s 22.1 UNTAET Regulation 2000/15. 
21 Raub L (2009) 1024, 1029. 
22 Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the 
Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, appended to the Report of the Planning 
Mission on the Establishment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone Transmitted by the 
Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council of 8 March 2002, appending the 
Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL Statute) UN Doc. S/2002/246, available 
at http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=uClnd1MJeEw%3d&tabid=176 (accessed 
25 October 2013). 
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January 2002.23 The SCSL is seated in Freetown, though the trial of Charles Taylor 
has been removed to The Hague for security reasons. Not being integrated into the 
Sierra Leonean justice system, the SCSL considers itself an autonomous international 
court.24 Its composition is largely international, featuring only one Sierra Leonean 
judge in its Appeals Chamber and one in one of the two Trial Chambers.25 The SCSL 
is funded by voluntary contributions of willing states.26 
2.2.4  Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 
From 1975 to 1979, approximately 20 to 25 per cent of Cambodian citizens lost their 
lives under the rule of Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge regime.27 However, due to armed 
struggles that lasted until 1998, it was not until then that the establishment of a 
criminal tribunal to account for these crimes was conceivable. After initial 
negotiations to set up a tribunal between the UN and the Cambodian government 
failed, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) were created 
domestically in 2001. However, an agreement was struck between the UN and 
Cambodia in 2003, in accordance with which the ECCC’s legal basis was later 
amended.28 The ECCC are integrated into the domestic court system and seated in 
Phnom Penh. Though national judges form the majorities in all chambers, at least one 
                                                
23 Arts 1-5 SCSL Statute. 
24 Prosecutor v Taylor, SCSL (Appeals Chamber), decision of 31 May 2004 para 42. 
25 The current composition of the SCSL is available at http://www.sc-sl.org/ 
ABOUT/CourtOrganization/Chambers/tabid/86/Default.aspx (accessed 25 October 2013).  
26 Raub L (2009) 1036. 
27 Horsington H ‘The Khmer Rouge Tribunal’ (2004) 5 Melbourne Journal of International 
Law 462, 465; Raub L (2009) 1031. 
28 Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers, with inclusion of amendments as 
promulgated on 27 October 2004, available at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/ 
document/legal/law-on-eccc (accessed 25 October 2013); Agreement Concerning the 
Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic 
Kampuchea, annexed to UN Doc. A/RES/57/228B of 6 June 2003. 
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international judge must vote in favour of any decision.29 The ECCC are funded by 
the Cambodian government and by voluntary donations.30 
2.2.5  War Crimes Chamber (Bosnia and Herzegovina) 
Like the Regulation 64 Panels, the War Crimes Chamber (WCC) in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina operates alongside the ICTY. The reason for the establishment of the 
WCC, however, was mainly to facilitate the ICTY’s completion strategy, which 
involved the transfer of proceedings from the ICTY to national courts.31 The WCC is 
integrated into the Criminal Division of the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 
Sarajevo as a specialised chamber. It applies domestic criminal law, which contains 
crimes under international law.32 The WCC has initially been composed of both 
national and international judges, though the latter have been incrementally reduced, 
and as of 2013 international judges have been replaced completely by national 
judges.33 Given that mixed composition can be considered a constitutive element of 
hybrid courts, the WCC has arguably transitioned from a hybrid body to a purely 
domestic institution. It has been funded partially by the national Ministry of Justice’s 
regular budget and partially by voluntary contributions from donor countries.34 
2.2.6  Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) was established to prosecute, in particular, 
persons responsible for the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq 
Hariri in February 2005. It was created by the UN Security Council and set up in 
                                                
29Art 14(1) ECCC Law. 
30 Skilbek R ‘Funding Justice: The Price of War Crimes Trials’ (2008) 15/3 Human Rights 
Brief 7. 
31 For details, see Werle G (2009) para 278. 
32 See Werle G (2009) para 291. 
33 The current composition of the WCC is available at http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/ 
?opcija=bio&jezik=e (accessed 25 October 2013). 
34 Skilbek R (2008) 8.  
 
 
 
 
 10 
accordance with an agreement between the UN and the Lebanese government.35 To 
date, it is the only hybrid court established by the UN Security Council based on 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The STL will only apply Lebanese criminal law,36 
though international judges form the majority in both its Trial Chamber and Appeals 
Chamber.37 The STL is seated in The Hague and thus, untypically for hybrid courts, 
not in the commission state. Another unique feature of the STL is the existence of a 
pre-trial judge, whose task is to review indictments and prepare cases for trial.38 Like 
the SCSL, the STL is funded by voluntary contributions of willing states.39 
2.2.7  Extraordinary African Chambers (Senegal) 
The Extraordinary African Chambers (EAC) are the most recent example of a hybrid 
court. They were established in February 2013 in order to prosecute crimes committed 
under the rule of Hissène Habré in Chad from 1982 to 1990.40 The EAC are integrated 
into the Senegalese court system and seated in Dakar. Though the crimes were 
committed in Chad, a link between their location and the atrocities exists due to the 
fact that Habré has fled to Senegal after being overthrown in 1990. After years of 
failed attempts to prosecute Habré in Senegal, Chad and Belgium, the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) ordered Senegal to either prosecute or extradite him to Belgium 
                                                
35 See UN Security Council Resolution 1757 (2007) of 30 May 2007, UN Doc. S/RES/1757 
(2007), appending the Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL Statute). 
36 Art 2 STL Statute. For details on the insofar ambiguous Art 3 STL Statute, see below 30. 
37 Art 8 STL Statute. 
38 See http://www.stl-tsl.org/en/about-the-stl/unique-features/an-autonomous-pre-trial-judge 
(accessed 25 October 2013). 
39 See http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/lebanon/tribunal/timeline.shtml (accessed 
25 October 2013). 
40 Statut des Chambres africaines extraordinaires (EAC Statute), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/node/113271 (accessed 25 October 2013). An unofficial English 
translation is available at http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/09/02/statute-extraordinary-african-
chambers (accessed 25 October 2013). 
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in July 2012,41 eventually resulting in the creation of the EAC. The EAC have 
jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and torture 
committed in Chad from 1982 to 1990.42 Apart from the Trial Chamber and the 
Appeals Chamber, the EAC uniquely feature an Investigating Chamber and an 
Indicting Chamber.43 The presidents of the Trial Chamber and the Appeals Chamber 
will be nationals of an African Union state other than Senegal, while the remaining 
judges will be exclusively Senegalese.44 The EAC are funded through donations by 
willing countries and organisations, most notably Chad and the European Union.45 
2.3  Observations 
It can be seen from the foregoing sections that hybrid courts are highly heterogeneous 
in particular with regard to the type and extent of their internationalisation. Hybrid 
courts may take the form of autonomous ‘international’ courts that are effectively 
‘nationalised’ due to a few national elements,46 though most are essentially integrated 
into the domestic court system. Moreover, the integration of a hybrid court may be 
centralised within a specific court, or decentralised throughout the court system.47 
Their ad hoc nature and involvement of both national and international judges or 
prosecutors are the most predominant features of hybrid courts. However, while 
international judges formed the majority in most hybrid courts and chambers, a few 
feature majorities of national judges. This is observable particularly in hybrid courts 
                                                
41 Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v Senegal) 
(Merits), ICJ, judgment of 22 July 2012 39. 
42 Art 3 EAC Statute. 
43 Art 11 EAC Statute.  
44 Art 11 EAC Statute. 
45 See http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/09/11/qa-case-hiss-ne-habr-extraordinary-african-
chambers-senegal#15 (accessed 25 October 2013). 
46 See the SCSL and the STL. 
47 Such as the Regulation 64 Panels. See also Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (2008) 12-14. 
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set up long after the alleged crimes have been committed,48 arguably related to the 
fact that a functional domestic justice system is more likely to be available. 
Considerable differences exist in other areas as well. While the legal bases of most 
hybrid courts provide for the application of both international and domestic criminal 
law, others merely apply domestic criminal law.49 Several hybrid courts have been 
created unilaterally under an interim UN administration,50 though the establishment of 
a hybrid court is typically based on the cooperation between and international 
organisation and a sovereign government. Usually, this includes the involvement of 
the UN. However, the establishment of the EAC indicates that the international aspect 
regarding the creation of a hybrid court may also be present by virtue of the 
involvement of a regional organisation, such as the African Union. Finally, while 
hybrid courts are usually seated in the state in which the crimes were committed, 
some are removed from the locus delicti for various reasons.51 Thus, it can be noted 
that there is no single hybrid court model, but rather as many as there are hybrid 
courts and situational particularities leading to their establishment.  
Nonetheless, certain tendencies can be observed. Only the earliest hybrid courts have 
been set up unilaterally, whereas the establishment of a hybrid court by the state 
concerned in cooperation with an international organisation has become the norm.  
While their cost-effectiveness has arguably been a major motivation for the 
establishment of the first hybrid courts, a stronger emphasis on their potential positive 
effects as a transitional justice instrument is apparent nowadays.52 Moreover, it is 
observable that the centralised integration of hybrid courts into the domestic court 
                                                
48 See the ECCC and the EAC. 
49 See the Regulation 64 Panels, the WCC and the STL. 
50 See the SPSC and the Regulation 64 Panels. 
51 See the EAC, the STL and the SCSL’s trial of Charles Taylor. 
52 See, e.g., Dickinson LA (2003) 299 (regarding the establishment of the SCSL); Raub L 
(2009) 1032 (regarding the establishment of the ECCC).  
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system is opted for in most scenarios. Accordingly, they are most commonly seated in 
the state of commission, and generally only located in another state for security 
reasons 53  or due to other unique circumstances. 54  Similarly, tendencies emerge 
regarding the applicable law. Normally, hybrid courts apply both international and 
national criminal law, whereas exclusively domestic law is applicable only where no 
corresponding international provision exists or where international criminal law has 
been domesticated.55 
2.4  Reasons for the establishment of hybrid courts 
2.4.1  Flexibility in transitional settings 
It is apparent from the foregoing that hybrid courts are most commonly set up in 
transitional states, following a period of time in which serious crimes have been 
committed on a large scale.56 The national justice system in such post-conflict states 
is often unavailable or incapable of conducting trials adequately. Thus, some form of 
international help is frequently required in order to carry out prosecutions.57 However, 
the needs of respective states vary greatly, and especially depend on the extent to 
which the national justice system is available. Moreover, criminal proceedings may be 
envisaged to take place alongside other transitional justice instruments, such as truth 
and reconciliation commissions, and a state may wish to create a certain relationship 
                                                
53 See the STL and the SCSL’s trial of Charles Taylor. 
54 See, e.g., the developments leading to the creation of the EAC. 
55 See the STL, which is mainly concerned with an act of terrorism, and the application of 
domesticated international criminal law by the Regulation 64 Panels or the WCC. 
56 Werle G (2009) para 78. 
57 Ambach P ‘Laufen hybride ad hoc-Gerichte dem Internationalen Strafgerichtshof den Rang 
ab? Eine Bestandsaufnahme’ (2005) 2 Humanitäres Völkerrecht – Informationsschriften 108; 
Egonda-Ntende F ‘Justice after Conflict: Challenges Facing “Hybrid” Courts: National 
Tribunals with International Participation’ (2005) 1 Humanitäres Völkerrecht –
 Informationsschriften/Journal of International Law of Peace and Armed Conflict 24. 
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between such institutions.58 For instance, this may include guidelines on cooperation 
regarding the exchange information on cases several institutions are concerned with. 
Similarly, hybrid courts may be implemented alongside an existing international 
criminal tribunal.59 Here, too, providing for a specific cooperative relationship to such 
international criminal courts may be desirable. Moreover, since hybrid courts can be 
given jurisdiction over both crimes under international law and domestic crimes, they 
may cover a more extensive catalogue of crimes than purely international or purely 
national courts.60  
The hybrid court model enables a state to craft a court precisely matching its needs 
regarding these considerations, and thus provides for more flexibility to address and 
adapt to particularities of transitional settings than purely international courts.  
2.4.2  Costs-effectiveness 
The increasing establishment of hybrid courts is moreover related to the relatively 
high costs and low efficiency of the purely international ad hoc tribunals established 
in the 1990s. The ICTY and ICTR budgets have, at one point, accounted for 15 per 
cent of the UN budget,61 and their proceedings have taken significantly longer than 
initially anticipated.62 Amongst other reasons, this contributed to a ‘tribunal fatigue’63 
within the international community at the end of the 1990s. Hybrid courts, however, 
can be financed through various means and are considerably less expensive to set up 
and run, which has been an important motivation for their establishment.64  
                                                
58 On this issue, see Ambos K Internationales Strafrecht 3 ed (2011) 139-40. For instance, 
there was a truth commission operating alongside the SCSL in Sierra Leone. 
59 See above 5-6 and 8, regarding the Regulation 64 Panels and the WCC. 
60 Ambach P (2005) 110. 
61 Nouwen SMH (2006) 191; Ambach P (2005) 113. 
62 Ambach P (2005) 113. 
63 Dickinson LA (2003) 308. 
64 See Egonda-Ntende F (2005) 25; Ingadottir T ‘The Financing of Internationalized Criminal 
Courts and Tribunals’ in Romano CPR, Nollkaemper A & Kleffner JK (2005) 271-89. 
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2.4.3  Capacity building and norm-penetration 
Moreover, hybrid courts ideally strengthen the national criminal justice system. The 
inability of a domestic justice system to carry out prosecutions may be attributable to 
the destruction of the infrastructure. However, in many instances a more pressing 
issue is the lack of legal personnel with the necessary qualifications and experience. 
Through working alongside international judges, prosecutors or lawyers, national 
jurists are likely to gain valuable legal expertise and experience.65 Trials taking place 
before international courts removed from the state concerned, on the other hand, 
cannot promote such local capacity building, which is particularly desirable in post-
conflict states.66  
Similarly, the prosecution of crimes under international law with the help of the 
international community and international experts is instrumental in the promotion of 
the norms of international law on the national level. This not only includes norms of 
substantive international criminal law, but also fair trial standards.67 Thus, the mixed 
composition of hybrid courts may at least indirectly foster the internalisation of 
international norms in the domestic sphere. While certainly intangible to a large 
degree, this ‘norm-penetration’ effect68 is another potential advantage of hybrid courts 
over international or national criminal courts. 
2.4.4  Locational advantage 
The fact that hybrid courts are most commonly established in the state concerned is 
moreover a practical advantage. Unlike international courts that are normally far 
                                                
65 Dickinson LA (2003) 307; Cassese A ‘The Role of Internationalized Courts in the Fight 
Against Criminality’ in Romano CPR, Nollkaemper A & Kleffner JK (2005) 6. 
66 Dickinson LA (2003) 303-4; Raub L (2009) 1020. 
67 Raub L (2009) 1031. See also Cassese A in Romano CPR, Nollkaemper A & Kleffner JK 
(2005) 6. 
68 Dickinson LA (2003) 304; Nouwen SMH (2006) 191. 
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removed from the commission state (such as the ICTY, the ICTR or the ICC), hybrid 
courts have more direct access to witnesses and other evidence.69 Accordingly, there 
are fewer logistical obstacles involved, which in turn results in lower costs and 
speedier proceedings.70 
2.4.5  Perception of legitimacy, ownership and impartiality 
Hybrid courts are moreover advantageous as regards the perception of their 
proceedings within the state in which the crimes have occurred. At first, due to 
national elements regarding their creation, location or personnel, hybrid courts are 
less likely to be perceived as an imposed interference from outside.71 In particular, a 
court co-established by the state concerned eliminates reservations regarding the 
court’s jurisdiction and state sovereignty.72 Moreover, the applicability of national 
law and the involvement of national personnel can ensure that domestic legal culture 
and corresponding expertise are represented. At the same time, the involvement of the 
international community counteracts perceptions of bias and lack of impartiality that 
may be associated with trials carried out by judges and prosecutors who had worked 
under a prior repressive regime.73 Thus, the combination of national and international 
elements can be instrumental in ensuring that the proceedings are perceived as 
impartial and legitimate.74  
Furthermore, criminal trials can constitute opportunities for a society to come to terms 
with atrocities committed in its past. The society’s interest in conducting trials 
                                                
69 Cassese A in Romano CPR, Nollkaemper A & Kleffner JK (2005) 4. 
70 Ambach P Eine Rahmenkonvention für die Errichtung hybrider internationaler 
Strafgerichte als Mittel zur Garantie moderner Völkerrechtsstandards im Rahmen zukünftiger 
Ad-hoc-Strafgerichtsbarkeit für Völkerrechtsverbrechen (2011) 107. 
71 Benzing M & Bergsmo M in Romano CPR, Nollkaemper A & Kleffner JK (2005) 409; 
Werle G (2009) para 78. 
72 Mégret F ‘In Defence of Hybridity: Towards a Representational Theory of International 
Criminal Justice’ (2005) 38 Cornell International Law Journal 6. 
73 Dickinson LA (2003) 301. 
74 Cassese A in Romano CPR, Nollkaemper A & Kleffner JK (2005) 6. 
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through its own criminal justice system, the involvement of national personnel, and 
the local exposure of the perpetrators can be described as ‘ownership’ of such 
criminal proceedings.75 As opposed to purely international courts, whose activities 
often lack any link to the state in which the crimes have been committed, hybrid 
courts are able to convey such local ownership of the proceedings similarly to 
national courts.  
Regarding these aspects, hybrid courts have the potential to further national 
reconciliation and a society’s attempts to come to terms with atrocities committed in 
its past. Thus, they may play a significant role as a transitional justice instrument, and 
are potentially better suited to do so than purely international or purely national 
criminal courts. 
2.5  Deficiencies 
The advantages of hybrid courts, however, are only one side of the coin, and in fact 
some of the aforementioned aspects could also be considered disadvantages. In 
particular, the lower costs of such courts have been described to be a potential 
weakness.76 Scarce financial resources could lead to serious operational problems, 
ranging from the unavailability of access to the internet, or to international legal 
resources in general, to the lack of effective translation services necessary for court 
members to communicate with one another.77 Such deficiencies may also affect a 
hybrid court’s jurisprudence, especially a lack of access to pertinent international 
legal sources. Moreover, courts could be under-staffed and their personnel under-
                                                
75 See, e.g., Cassese A in Romano CPR, Nollkaemper A & Kleffner JK (2005) 6; Mégret F 
(2005) 25-6; Nouwen SMH (2006) 191; Dickinson LA (2003) 299; Raub L (2009) 1030. 
76 Cassese A in Romano CPR, Nollkaemper A & Kleffner JK (2005) 10. 
77 See, e.g., Egonda-Ntende F (2005) 25; Raub L (2009) 1030. 
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qualified due to insufficient funding.78 Eventually, the lack of financial resources 
could therefore cause hybrid court case law to be of an inferior legal quality.79  
Similarly, the location in the commission state has been regarded as problematic. 
Where atrocities have been committed or condoned by state agents who are still 
influential in the state concerned, hybrid courts could face pressure and attempts of 
interference by such local actors.80 Moreover, the local perception of ownership, 
legitimacy and impartiality of the proceedings before a hybrid court cannot be taken 
for granted. Unclear division of responsibility between national and international 
actors may hamper such perceptions,81 and international fair trial standards do not 
permeate proceedings simply due to the involvement of the international 
community.82 
Some hybrid courts, such as the SPSC and the Regulation 64 Panels,83 have indeed 
fallen short in some of these respects in the past. Such instances show that, while the 
reasons for which hybrid courts are established are certainly valid, the aims pursued 
with their establishment do not materialise automatically. Rather, the implementation 
of their advantages in the transitional justice context is a challenge for hybrid courts 
and their creators on its own.  
Another shortcoming of past hybrid courts is the lack of adequate efforts regarding 
their legacy in the transitional state. Given the fact that hybrid courts are typically 
targeted interventions with limited temporal jurisdiction, efforts towards a long-
                                                
78 See, e.g., Raub L (2009) 1030. 
79 Ambos K Internationales Strafrecht 3 ed (2011) 138. 
80 Cassese A in Romano CPR, Nollkaemper A & Kleffner JK (2005) 4. 
81 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (2008) 10. 
82 See Raub L (2009) 1030. 
83 For details, see Egonda-Ntende F (2005) 26-9; Raub L (2009) 1030-1. See also Ambos K 
Internationales Strafrecht 3 ed (2011) 138.  
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lasting positive effect on the transitional society are desirable.84 In this regard, the 
lack of planning, outreach, and completion strategies including the transfer of 
unresolved cases has hampered the legacy of hybrid courts.85 Moreover, the creation 
of hybrid courts in the past has frequently been accompanied by insufficient 
assessment of local capacity, 86  which may result in an inadequate degree of 
internationalisation, and strategies as to the realisation of the potential advantages of 
hybrid courts as a transitional justice instrument have not been formulated.87 Since the 
establishment of a hybrid court constitutes a unique opportunity for the transitional 
state and the international community, more efforts should indeed be made to 
maximise their abovementioned potential advantages, in order for hybrid courts to 
leave behind more than just ‘convictions and acquittals’.88 
                                                
84 Office of the United Nations Commissioner for Human Rights (2008) 5-6. 
85 Office of the United Nations Commissioner for Human Rights (2008) 8. 
86 Office of the United Nations Commissioner for Human Rights (2008) 9. 
87 Office of the United Nations Commissioner for Human Rights (2008) 7-9. 
88 Office of the United Nations Commissioner for Human Rights (2008) 1. 
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CHAPTER 3:  THE ROLE OF HYBRID COURTS WITHIN THE 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 
Apart from their characteristics and the transitional role of hybrid courts in the 
domestic sphere, it is moreover necessary to address their role on the international 
level. The position of hybrid courts within the international legal system deserves 
particular scrutiny because it has implications as to their possible effects on 
international criminal law: While a negligible position on the international level 
would diminish the impact of hybrid courts from the outset, a strong position suggests 
the possibility of more considerable effects on international criminal law. A 
significant issue in this regard is the scope of the jurisdiction of hybrid courts vis-à-
vis international and national courts, and especially the position of hybrid courts in 
relation to the ICC. Furthermore, the future utility of hybrid courts may be questioned 
in general. Given the very establishment of the ICC and the operational problems 
former hybrid courts have encountered, it could be questionable whether the 
establishment of hybrid courts is likely to be – or should be – continued in the future. 
3.1  The ambit of hybrid court jurisdiction 
3.1.1  Vis-à-vis international criminal courts 
The question of the scope of the jurisdiction of hybrid courts vis-à-vis international 
criminal courts may arise in relation to UN ad hoc tribunals, namely the ICTY and the 
ICTR, and in relation to the ICC.  
Where a hybrid court is established to operate alongside a UN ad hoc tribunal, the 
latter has primary jurisdiction. Having been established by the UN Security Council 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, all UN member states are obliged to cooperate 
with the ICTY and the ICTR. This follows from the ad hoc tribunals’ nature as 
subsidiary organs of the UN Security Council under Article 29 of the UN Charter. 
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Moreover, their primacy pertains to both national and hybrid courts regardless of the 
state in which they have been established.89 Thus, for instance, the Regulation 64 
Panels and the WCC, both of which operate alongside the ICTY, are subject to the 
ICTY’s primacy. 
The jurisdiction of the ICC, on the other hand, is based on the complementarity 
principle, which is implemented as an admissibility test in Article 17 of the ICC 
Statute.90 According to this provision, a case is inadmissible before the ICC in 
principle when national authorities are investigating or prosecuting a case, have 
prosecuted, or have investigated but decided not to prosecute. However, the provision 
also states that the inadmissibility is dependent on the ability or willingness of the 
state to pursue any such action, which is to be determined by the ICC.  
Since Article 17 of the ICC Statute presumes prosecutions to take place before 
national courts,91 the question with regard to hybrid courts is whether they should be 
considered ‘national’ in this context. The provision does not expressly address the 
issue, despite the Regulation 64 Panels and the SPSC being operational at the time of 
the Rome Conference. This may suggest that the drafters did not intend the ICC’s 
jurisdiction to be subsidiary under such circumstances.92  
                                                
89 See Arts 25, 29, 39, 41, 103 Charter of the United Nations of 24 October 1945 
(UN Charter) 1 UNTS XVI. 
90 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (hereafter Rome Statute or ICC Statute) 
(1998) 37 ILM 1002. 
91 From its wording – ‘by a State’ (Art 17(1)(a), (b) ICC Statute), ‘national decision’ 
(Art 17(2)(a) ICC Statute), ‘national judicial system’ (Art 17(3) ICC Statute) – the provision 
seems to apply only to purely national courts, see Benzing M & Bergsmo M in Romano CPR, 
Nollkaemper A & Kleffner JK (2005) 411. 
92 Ambach P (2005) 115. 
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However, from a teleological perspective, it is convincing to treat hybrid courts as 
national courts for the purposes of Article 17 of the ICC Statute. 93  The 
complementarity principle is aimed at ensuring that perpetrators are held accountable 
as well as at protecting state sovereignty.94 In these aspects, hybrid courts do not 
differ from national courts, as they are typically co-established by the sovereign 
government of the state concerned and equally aim at counteracting impunity. Given 
the purpose of the provision, it should also be irrelevant whether a hybrid court has 
been created unilaterally or bilaterally, or whether its composition features a majority 
of international or national judges.95 By the same token, this should moreover apply to 
‘nationalised international courts’, such as the SCSL or the STL.96 However, in such 
instances, the rather unambiguous wording of Article 17 of the ICC Statute may 
necessitate its analogous application.97  
However, even in instances where a case is admissible under Article 17 of the ICC 
Statute, hybrid courts may nonetheless operate alongside the ICC in a supplementing 
role. As evidenced by the Regulation 64 Panels and the WCC, hybrid courts are well 
suited to work alongside and ease the caseload of purely international tribunals that 
operate simultaneously. Similarly to the UN ad hoc tribunals, the ICC only has the 
capacity to try a limited number of persons who are presumed to be most responsible 
for large-scale atrocities. Accordingly, lower ranking perpetrators may be prosecuted 
before hybrid courts, especially where the domestic justice system is incapable of 
carrying out such prosecutions on its own. Moreover, notwithstanding a functional 
                                                
93 Ambos K Internationales Strafrecht 3 ed (2011) 138 n 300; Benzing M & Bergsmo M in 
Romano CPR, Nollkaemper A & Kleffner JK (2005) 412; Raub L (2009) 1048-9. 
94 Ambach P (2005) 115; Benzing M & Bergsmo M in Romano CPR, Nollkaemper A & 
Kleffner JK (2005) 412. 
95 Benzing M & Bergsmo M in Romano CPR, Nollkaemper A & Kleffner JK (2005) 412. 
96 See also Benzing M & Bergsmo M in Romano CPR, Nollkaemper A & Kleffner JK 
(2005) 412. 
97 Ambach P (2005) 115. 
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domestic justice system, such supplementary prosecutions may be carried out by 
hybrid courts more appropriately than by national courts, given their aforementioned 
advantages in the transitional context.98  
3.1.2  Vis-à-vis national criminal courts 
In cases of complete integration into the national court system, the jurisdiction of a 
hybrid court is determined according the relevant domestic laws, while their legal 
bases may ascribe a special competence regarding the relevant crimes and time 
frame.99 The legal bases of hybrid courts that are not integrated into the domestic 
court system typically provide for concurrent jurisdiction, with the hybrid courts 
having primacy over national courts within the scope of their jurisdiction. 100 
However, the jurisdiction of hybrid courts vis-à-vis criminal courts in third states is 
less clear. Typically, hybrid courts are not established by the UN Security Council 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter – the STL being the only exception as of today. 
Thus, as opposed to the ICTY and ICTR, they do not automatically have primacy 
over courts in third states.101 This pertains even with respect to courts that can be 
considered primarily ‘international’ in nature, such as the SCSL.102 But for the 
possibility of UN Security Council resolutions,103 which could force other states to 
cooperate with a hybrid court regardless of the nature of its establishment, hybrid 
courts cannot seize jurisdiction over cases pending before courts in third states. 
                                                
98 Benzing M & Bergsmo M in Romano CPR, Nollkaemper A & Kleffner JK (2005) 416; 
Dickinson LA (2003) 1066; Njikam O, Pirmurat S & Stegmiller I ‘Der Sondergerichtshof für 
Sierra Leone, der Oberste Irakische Strafgerichtshof und das Sondertribunal für Libanon – ein 
Vergleich’ (2008) Zeitschrift für Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik 432; Raub L (2009) 
1053.  
99 See, e.g., Art 2 ECCC Law; s 2.3 UNTAET Regulation 2000/15. 
100 See Art 8 SCSL Statute; Art 4 STL Statute. 
101 Ambach P (2005) 113. 
102 Ambach P (2005) 113. 
103 In this regard, see UN Security Council Resolution 1638 (2005) of 11 November 2005, 
UN Doc. S/RES/1638 (2005) regarding the obligation of Liberia to extradite Charles Taylor. 
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However, notwithstanding the possibility of prosecutions in third states under the 
principle of universal jurisdiction, this scenario is arguably of little practical 
significance. 
3.2  The future utility of hybrid courts  
3.2.1  Co-existence with the ICC 
Given that the first hybrid courts were established before the Rome Statute entered 
into force, it was not clear whether this criminal justice model would outlive the 
creation of the ICC. Moreover, the creation of further hybrid courts could be 
counterproductive in relation to efforts regarding the establishment of the ICC as the 
primary – and ideally universal – international criminal justice institution. However, 
several considerations suggest that the ICC does not make the creation of hybrid 
courts obsolete or undesirable.  
The ICC’s lack of universality makes the establishment of hybrid courts an option for 
states that have not ratified the Rome Statute,104 especially where a UN Security 
Council referral in accordance with Article 13(b) of the ICC Statute is unlikely.105 
With regard to the ICC’s limited temporal jurisdiction, the same is true where the 
crimes have been committed prior to the entry into force of the Rome Statute. For 
example, this has been the case regarding the crimes the ECCC and EAC are 
concerned with.  
Furthermore, hybrid courts may be created even where the ICC has both temporal and 
territorial jurisdiction. It has already been argued that hybrid courts should be 
considered ‘national’ courts for the purposes of the complementarity principle. 
                                                
104 Ambach P (2005) 117; Benzing M & Bergsmo M in Romano CPR, Nollkaemper A & 
Kleffner JK (2005) 408-9. 
105 An example is the Darfur situation, where a UNSC referral was initially uncertain, see 
Ambach P (2005) 117; Raub L (2009) 1050-1. 
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Bearing in mind the advantages of hybrid courts discussed above,106 even in ICC 
member states, the establishment of a hybrid court may indeed be more desirable than 
prosecutions before the ICC or national courts. For instance, with regard to a situation 
before the ICC, the establishment of a hybrid court has at least been contemplated in 
Kenya.107 As set out above, hybrid courts may moreover operate alongside and 
supplement the activities of the ICC.108 
For these reasons, hybrid courts do not necessarily counteract the ICC’s establishment 
as the primary international criminal justice institution, but rather constitute a flexible 
interim solution.109 Thus the creation of the ICC does not implicate a departure from 
the use of hybrid courts in the future. 
3.2.2  Consequences of past deficiencies 
The future utility of hybrid courts may also be called into question due to the 
previously discussed deficiencies of former hybrid courts. 110  This pertains in 
particular to the lack of smooth administration and financial resources, which has 
been shown to possibly cause serious operational problems. Indeed, such issues have 
sparked the perception of hybrid courts as administering ‘justice on the cheap’111 and 
rendering decisions of inferior legal quality.112 It certainly needs to be ensured that 
future hybrid courts will not encounter considerable issues regarding these aspects. 
However, these shortcomings are of an operational nature, and thus relatively easily 
rectifiable through adequate funding and administration of future hybrid courts. 
Therefore, these considerations do not affect the general viability of the hybrid 
                                                
106 See above 12-16. 
107 See, e.g., Raub L (2009) 1050-1. 
108 See above 21. 
109 See Njikam O, Pirmurat S & Stegmiller I (2008) 432. 
110 See above 16-18; Cassese A International Criminal Law 2 ed (2008) 334-5; Raub L 
(2009) 1044-6. 
111 Egonda-Ntende F (2005) 25. 
112 Ambos K Internationales Strafrecht 3 ed (2011) 138. 
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criminal justice model in the future,113 and are thus also unlikely to cause a decrease 
in the future establishment of hybrid courts. 
3.3  Conclusions 
Neither the creation of the ICC nor deficiencies of former hybrid courts indicate a 
departure from the hybrid court model in the future. Moreover, the ambit of the 
jurisdiction of hybrid courts is considerable. Unless a given case is prosecuted before 
a UN ad hoc tribunal or a court in a third state, hybrid courts, as a principle, have 
jurisdiction over the crimes and the territory set forth in their legal bases. For these 
reasons, hybrid courts are likely to play a significant role regarding the future 
development of international criminal law. 
                                                
113 See Ambach P (2005) 112. 
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CHAPTER 4:  THE IMPACT OF HYBRID COURTS ON THE  
DEVELOPMENT OF SUBSTANTIVE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
4.1  Diversification vs. consolidation 
As mentioned in the beginning, a significant question regarding the application of 
substantive international criminal law by hybrid courts is whether it causes a 
consolidation or fragmentation of international criminal law.114 There is a legitimate 
interest in the uniform application of international criminal law, especially from the 
viewpoint of legal certainty.115 However, it must be borne in mind that holding 
perpetrators of mass atrocities accountable is the primary aim of international criminal 
law. 116  Since counteracting impunity should be prioritised over a uniform 
international jurisprudence, it cannot be said that any deviation from established 
international criminal law by hybrid courts has a ‘negative impact’ per se.  
However, the following discussion of the legal bases and jurisprudence of hybrid 
courts will be confined to their coherence with substantive international criminal law 
hitherto, and thus largely set aside considerations regarding the value of its uniform 
application as well as aspects relating to domestic criminal law and criminal 
procedure. 
4.2  The SCSL, ECCC and STL as a representative selection 
The discussion will moreover focus on the SCSL, the ECCC and the STL, though 
reference will be made to other hybrid courts where appropriate. These three courts 
can be considered representative in two ways.  
                                                
114 See, e.g., Benzing M & Bergsmo M in Romano CPR, Nollkaemper A & Kleffner JK 
(2005) 410-11; Buergenthal T (2001) 267-275; Pocar F (2002) 304-308; Raub L (2009) 1048. 
115 Meisenberg S (2004) 176; Pocar F (2004) 307. 
116 Cassese A in Romano CPR, Nollkaemper A & Kleffner JK (2005) 3; Pocar F (2004) 307; 
Raub L (2009) 1048. 
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First, they cover a wide range of various degrees and types of internationalisation. 
While the SCSL and STL are autonomous institutions, the ECCC are completely 
integrated into the domestic criminal justice system. The SCSL and ECCC apply both 
national and international criminal law, whereas the STL will only apply domestic 
criminal law. While international judges form the majority in the SCSL and STL, 
national judges form the majority within the ECCC. Furthermore, they have been 
established in different ways. The STL has been created by the UN Security Council, 
the SCSL is based on an agreement between the UN and Sierra Leone, and the ECCC 
have initially been created by domestic legislation, which has later been amended in 
accordance with an agreement between the UN and Cambodia.  
Secondly, as will be discussed in more detail below,117 the jurisprudence of these 
courts can be considered representative of the various possible positions of hybrid 
court case law in relation to previously established international criminal law: The 
SCSL has been the first court to interpret and apply the elements of several existing 
crimes, while the ECCC have partially deviated from settled ICTY and ICTR 
jurisprudence, and the STL has attempted to establish an entirely new crime under 
international law. 
4.3  Legal bases 
Before addressing the jurisprudence of these tribunals, however, it is indicated to 
scrutinise, in the following, their legal bases regarding their conformity with 
previously established international criminal law. Moreover, the legal bases of other 
hybrid courts will be briefly addressed for reasons of comparison regarding the 
respective inclusion of substantive international criminal law. 
                                                
117 See below 33-50. 
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4.3.1  SCSL Statute 
The SCSL Statute follows the ICTY and ICTR Statutes in numerous aspects. 
Concerning individual criminal responsibility, the SCSL Statute reproduces the ICTY 
and ICTR Statutes, the only addition being that domestic provisions on individual 
criminal responsibility shall apply with respect to the application of Sierra Leonean 
criminal law.118 As far as crimes under international law are concerned, the SCSL 
Statute contains provisions on crimes against humanity and war crimes.  
The definition of crimes against humanity is primarily based on the ICTR Statute.119 
Thus, as opposed to the relevant provision in the ICTY Statute, the formulation in the 
SCSL Statute is in conformity with customary international law to the effect that 
crimes against humanity need not be committed during an armed conflict.120 By the 
same token, the SCSL Statute’s omission of the ICTR Statute’s requirement that 
crimes against humanity needed to be committed with discriminatory intent reflects 
customary international law.121 Moreover, the SCSL Statute adopts several individual 
acts that may constitute crimes against humanity from the ICC Statute, namely 
‘sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy and any other form of sexual 
violence’.122 The SCSL Statute does not expressly include the so-called ‘policy 
element’, which is included in the ICC Statute. However, it is also required under the 
ICTY and ICTR jurisprudence.123  
                                                
118 See Art 6 SCSL Statute, Art 7 ICTY Statute, Art 6 ICTR Statute. 
119 See Art 2 SCSL Statute, Art 3 ICTR Statute. 
120 This ‘nexus requirement’ had been long abandoned under customary international law, see, 
e.g., Swart B ‘Internationalized Courts and Substantive Criminal Law’ in Romano CPR, 
Nollkaemper A & Kleffner JK (2005) 299; Werle G (2009) paras 783-4, 787. 
121 The only crime against humanity which requires such an intent is persecution, see, e.g., 
Prosecutor v Tadić, ICTY (Appeals Chamber), judgment of 15 July 1999, paras 273-305;  
122 See Art 2(g) SCSL Statute and Art 7(1)(g) ICC Statute. 
123 See Art 7(2)(a) ICC Statute; Meisenberg S (2004) 176 with further references. 
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The SCSL Statute contains two provisions on war crimes. Concerning violations of 
the Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and its Additional Protocol II 
(AP II),124 the SCSL Statute again almost precisely follows the ICTR Statute.125 
Moreover, three ‘other serious violations of international humanitarian law’ have been 
borrowed from the ICC Statute.126 Most significantly – considering the conflict at 
hand –, this includes the recruitment and use of child soldiers. The SCSL Statute does 
not expressly contain provisions on war crimes committed in an international armed 
conflict, since the drafters considered the Sierra Leonean civil war to be a non-
international armed conflict.127 Moreover, genocide was not included in the SCSL 
Statute, since the UN Security Council did not see a need to do so.128 
A unique provision is Article 7 of the SCSL Statute, which provides for jurisdiction 
over juveniles. While child soldiers committed atrocious crimes during the civil war 
in Sierra Leone, the SCSL Statute places a strong emphasis on rehabilitative 
measures. Moreover, the SCSL’s prosecutor made it clear that juveniles would not be 
prosecuted before the SCSL.129  
Notably, the SCSL also addresses the relation to the ICTY and ICTR. Article 20(3) of 
the SCSL Statute states that, as far as international criminal law is concerned, SCSL 
judges shall be guided by pertinent case law of the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY and 
                                                
124 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts of 8 June 1977 (hereafter 
Additional Protocol II or AP II) 1125 UNTS 609. 
125 See Art 3 SCSL Statute and Art 4 ICTR Statute. 
126 See Art 4 SCSL Statute and Art 8(2)(e)(i), (iii), (vii) ICC Statute. It is not clear why other 
crimes defined in Art 8(2)(e) ICC Statute have not been included, see Swart B in Romano 
CPR, Nollkaemper A & Kleffner JK (2005) 301. 
127 Prosecutor v Fofana & Kondewa, SCSL (Appeals Chamber), decision of 25 May 2004 
para 25.  
128 Swart B in Romano CPR, Nollkaemper A & Kleffner JK (2005) 299, referring to UN 
Security Council Resolution 1315 (2000) of 14 August 2000, UN Doc. S/RES/1315 (2007). 
129 SCSL Public Affairs Office ‘Special Court Prosecutor Says He Will Not Prosecute 
Children’ Press Release of 2 November 2002, available at http://www.sc-sl.org/ 
LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=XRwCUe%2BaVhw%3D&tabid=196 (accessed 25 October 2013). 
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ICTR. This provision is especially noteworthy because, prima facie, it seems to 
counteract the possibility of an adverse diversification of international criminal law.  
4.3.2  ECCC Law 
Like the SCSL Statute, the ECCC Law draws from the ICTY and ICTR Statutes 
regarding the respective provisions on individual criminal responsibility.130 Moreover, 
it reproduces the ICTR Statute’s definition of crimes against humanity.131 Thus, like 
the SCSL Statute and in conformity with customary international law, it does not 
require the nexus to an armed conflict. However, in contrast to the SCSL Statute, the 
ECCC Law in addition adopts the requirement of discriminatory intent from the ICTR 
Statute. In this regard, the definition is thus more restrictive than customary 
international law, under which discriminatory intent is required only for the crime of 
persecution.132 Moreover, the ECCC Law is more restrictive with regard to the crime 
of genocide, reproducing the 1948 Genocide Convention, but omitting the crimes of 
complicity and incitement to commit genocide.133 As concerns war crimes, the ECCC 
Law includes grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.134 The relevant 
provision resembles those of the ICC and ICTY Statutes.135 The ECCC Law does not 
contain any express provisions on war crimes committed in internal armed conflict, 
although conduct amounting to such crimes must have been widespread during the 
relevant time.136 This is due to the fact that Cambodia had not ratified the Additional 
                                                
130 See Art 29 ECCC Law, Art 7 ICTY Statute, Art 6 ICTR Statute. 
131 See Art 5 ECCC Law, Art 3 ICTR Statute. 
132 See above 27 n 120; Werle G (2009) para 821. 
133 See Art 4 ECCC Law, Arts II, III Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide of 9 December 1948 (hereafter Genocide Convention) 78 UNTS 277; 
Swart B in Romano CPR, Nollkaemper A & Kleffner JK (2005) 298. 
134 Art 6 ECCC Law. The singular formulation (‘the Geneva Convention’) is presumably a 
typing error, see Swart B in Romano CPR, Nollkaemper A & Kleffner JK (2005) 301. 
135 See Art 6 ECCC Law, Art 8(2)(a) ICC Statute, Art 4 ICTY Statute. 
136 See Swart B in Romano CPR, Nollkaemper A & Kleffner JK (2005) 301. 
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Protocols I and II to the Geneva Conventions until 1980, and the relevant rules were 
not considered part of customary international law at the relevant time.137  
4.3.3  STL Statute 
The STL Statute generally provides for the application of Lebanese criminal law.138 
However, though this undoubtedly pertains to the applicable crimes, the statute is 
nevertheless unclear with regard to the modes individual criminal liability. While 
declaring applicable the entire body of Lebanese criminal law in Article 2, the STL 
Statute entails a separate provision on individual criminal responsibility in its 
Article 3, which incorporates elements of modes of liability found in the legal bases 
of the IMT, the IMTFE, and the UN ad hoc tribunals.139 Yet, the provision also 
reflects the relevant Lebanese law.140 In interpreting the relationship between Article 
2 and Article 3 of the STL Statute, the STL’s Appeals Chamber found that, in 
principle, Lebanese law should be applied. Rather, Article 3 was held to be applicable 
only where the application of the relevant domestic provisions would be in conflict 
with international law.141 Since the remainder of the applicable law before the STL is 
domestic, a presentation thereof is dispensed with.  
4.3.4  International criminal law in the legal bases of other hybrid courts 
Regarding the inclusion of substantive international criminal law, the legal bases of 
other hybrid courts should be briefly addressed for reasons of comparison. While the 
Regulation 64 Panels and the WCC are essentially domestic courts applying domestic 
law, the legal bases of the SPSC and EAC are especially suitable in this respect.  
                                                
137 Swart B in Romano CPR, Nollkaemper A & Kleffner JK (2005) 301. 
138 Art 2 STL Statute. 
139 See Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law, STL (Appeals Chamber), decision of 
16 February 2011 para 206 and footnotes. 
140 STL (Appeals Chamber), decision of 16 February 2011 para 206. 
141 STL (Appeals Chamber), decision of 16 February 2011 para 211. 
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The SPSC’s legal basis is UNTAET Regulation 2000/15. It is closely modelled after 
the ICC Statute regarding genocide,142 crimes against humanity,143 war crimes144 and, 
notably, individual criminal responsibility.145  
Likewise, the EAC Statute borrows heavily from the ICC Statute, though in a more 
selective way. While genocide is defined in conformity with the ICC Statute and the 
Genocide Convention,146 the EAC Statute omits several of the ICC Statute’s crimes 
against humanity and adds others.147 Regarding war crimes, the EAC Statute contains 
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. Here, the respective provisions of the ICC 
Statute are adopted almost verbatim.148 It moreover includes violations of the Geneva 
Conventions’ Common Article 3, again adopting the relevant provision of the ICC 
Statute, though with numerous omissions. 149  Regarding individual criminal 
responsibility, however, the EAC Statute draws from the ICTY and ICTR Statutes.150 
4.3.5  Observations 
The SCSL’s and ECCC’s legal bases feature a noteworthy degree of eclecticism when 
it comes to the definitions of crimes under international law.151 Borrowing from the 
statutes of various previous tribunals and partially adjusting them, taking into account 
customary international law, the crimes set forth in the SCSL Statute and the ECCC 
Law differ from any previously existing definitions. While some of these do not 
correspond entirely with customary international law, deviations are relatively slight, 
                                                
142 See s 4 UNTAET Regulation 2000/15, Art 6 ICC Statute, Art II Genocide Convention. 
143 See s 5 UNTAET Regulation 2000/15 and Art 7 ICC Statute. 
144 See s 6 UNTAET Regulation 2000/15 and Art 8 ICC Statute. 
145 See s 14 UNTAET Regulation 2000/15 and Art 25 ICC Statute. 
146 See Art 5 EAC Statute; Art 6 ICC Statute; Art II Genocide Convention.  
147 See Art 6 EAC Statute and Art 7 ICC Statute. Art 6 EAC Statute does not adopt 
Art 7(1)(e) and (h), while adding the crime of ‘massive and systematic practice of summary 
executions’. 
148 See Art 7(1) EAC Statute and Art 8(2)(a) ICC Statute 
149 See Art 7(2) EAC Statute and Art 8(2)(c), (e) ICC Statute. 
150 See Art 10 EAC Statute, Art 7 ICTY Statute, Art 6 ICTR Statute. 
151 Swart B in Romano CPR, Nollkaemper A & Kleffner JK (2005) 315. 
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tend to be restrictive, and are mostly due to the particularities of the conflicts at hand. 
Thus, the legal bases of the SCSL and ECCC rather exhibit the flexibility of hybrid 
courts in adapting to a particular situation than adversely diversifying international 
criminal law. It is noticeable that the legal bases of the SCSL and ECCC do not draw 
as heavily from the ICC Statute as the legal bases of other hybrid courts. This is 
unfortunate to the extent that the ICC Statute represents the predominant source of 
international criminal law today, and by primarily borrowing from the ICTY and 
ICTR Statutes, one could say that the drafters of the SCSL Statute and the ECCC Law 
missed a chance to contribute to the harmonisation of substantive international 
criminal law. The issue becomes especially clear regarding the provisions on 
individual criminal responsibility for crimes under international law. While the SCSL 
Statute and the ECCC Law reproduce the ICTY and ICTR Statutes, recourse could 
have been made to the more detailed ICC Statute, which for the first time included 
comprehensive provisions on individual criminal responsibility. 152  As will be 
discussed below, this has arguably had negative implications regarding the case law 
of these courts on individual criminal responsibility.153  
The STL Statute confines the applicable law to Lebanese criminal law, allowing for 
few conclusions to be drawn as to its relation to the previous state of international 
criminal law. However, it may be observed that its provision on modes of liability 
under international criminal law bears elements found in the statutes of other 
international criminal courts.154 
                                                
152 Werle G (2009) para 446. 
153 See also below 41-2; Schomburg W ‘Jurisprudence on JCE – revisiting a never ending 
story’ 3 June 2010 Cambodia Trial Monitor available at http://www.cambodia 
tribunal.org/sites/default/files/resources/ctm_blog_6_1_2010.pdf (accessed 25 October 
2013). 
154 STL (Appeals Chamber), decision of 16 February 2011 para 206 and footnotes. 
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4.4  Jurisprudence 
The following discussion of the SCSL, ECCC and STL jurisprudence will focus on a 
number of selected issues of substantive international criminal law. While the legal 
issues themselves are highly diverse, they are illustrative of the possible ways in 
which the legal position taken in the jurisprudence of a hybrid court may relate to 
previously established international criminal law. Accordingly, these issues will be 
discussed specifically regarding this aspect, whereas a comprehensive presentation of 
their respective legal details will be largely dispensed with. 
With regard to each hybrid court, it will first be outlined how a given legal issue was 
approached within the relevant jurisprudence. Moreover, it will be discussed how the 
respective decisions were received by other international or internationalised courts, 
as well as scholars. Subsequently, conclusions will be drawn regarding the impact of 
the jurisprudence on the development of substantive international criminal law, and 
whether or not the respective findings constitute a consolidation or fragmentation 
thereof. 
4.4.1  Special Court for Sierra Leone 
The SCSL’s jurisprudence has been concerned with crimes against humanity and war 
crimes committed in the Sierra Leonean civil war from 1996 to 2002. In particular, 
the SCSL was the first court to adjudicate on the war crimes of recruiting and using 
child soldiers and attacks on peacekeeping missions.  
4.4.1.1 Recruitment and use of child soldiers 
From its inception, the SCSL was expected to make significant contributions to 
jurisprudence regarding the war crime of recruiting or using child soldiers.155 The 
crime is included in Article 4(c) of the SCSL Statute, which adopts verbatim 
                                                
155 Meisenberg S (2004), 180; Meisenberg S (2008) 147. 
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Article 8(2)(e)(vii) of the ICC Statute. Prior to the ICC Statute, several international 
treaties obliged the respective states parties to take all feasible measures to ensure that 
children under 15 were neither recruited into the armed forces nor took part in 
hostilities.156  
However, in its first decision on the recruitment and use of child soldiers, the SCSL 
had to establish that the application of the relevant provision did not constitute a 
violation of the nullum crimen sine lege principle, as it was argued by one defendant 
that this war crime had not existed before the adoption of the Rome Statute.157 The 
SCSL found that the recruitment and use of child solders had in fact been a crime 
under customary international law at the relevant time.158 After having established a 
prohibition of the conduct in question under international humanitarian law, the SCSL 
applied the criteria developed by the ICTY in its Tadić jurisdictional decision as to 
the requirements under which violations of such a rule also entailed individual 
criminal responsibility under international law.159 Apart from the affirmation of these 
criteria, the establishment of the criminality of the recruitment and use of child 
soldiers under customary international law before 1996 was a significant contribution 
to international humanitarian law in itself.160  
                                                
156 See Art 77(2) Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts of 8 June 
1977 (hereafter Additional Protocol I or AP I) 1125 UNTS 3; Art 4(3)(c) AP II; Art 38(2), (3) 
Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989 (1989) 28 ILM 1456.  
157 Prosecutor v Norman, SCSL (Appeals Chamber), decision of 31 May 2004. 
158 Prosecutor v Norman, SCSL (Appeals Chamber), decision of 31 May 2004 para 53. 
However, see separate opinion Robertson paras 45-7. 
159 Prosecutor v Norman, SCSL (Appeals Chamber), decision of 31 May 2004 paras 25-7; 
Prosecutor v Tadić, ICTY (Appeals Chamber), decision of 2 October 1995 para 94. 
160 Meisenberg S (2004) 178. 
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In setting out the actus reus of the crime, the SCSL took recourse to the elements of 
crimes for Article 8(2)(e)(vii) of the ICC Statute.161 However, these included no 
interpretative guidance on the individual elements of the crime, i.e. ‘conscripting’, 
‘enlisting’ or ‘using’ child soldiers ‘to participate actively in hostilities’. The SCSL 
stated that the alternatives of ‘conscripting’ and ‘enlisting’ referred to compulsory and 
voluntary ‘recruiting’ of a child, respectively. 162 Thus, the SCSL supported the notion 
that the two separate terms had been used to clarify that recruitment need not be 
achieved by forcible means, and that the consent of a child was not a defence to the 
crime.163 Moreover, the SCSL found that ‘conscripting’ was not restricted to formal 
compulsory service in the armed forces of a state, but included coercive recruitment 
of children by any armed group in order to use them to participate actively in 
hostilities.164  
Regarding the use of children ‘to participate actively in hostilities’, the SCSL had to 
answer the question whether ‘active’ participation was identical to ‘direct’ 
                                                
161 See Prosecutor v Brima, Kamara & Kanu, SCSL (Trial Chamber II), judgment of 20 June 
2007 para 731; Prosecutor v Fofana & Kondewa, SCSL (Trial Chamber I), judgment of 
2 August 2007 paras 195-6. The elements of crimes for Art 8(2)(e)(vii) ICC Statute read: 
‘(1) The perpetrator conscripted or enlisted one or more persons into an armed force or group 
or used one or more persons to participate actively in hostilities. (2) Such person or persons 
were under the age of 15 years. (3) The Perpetrator knew or should have known that such 
person or persons were under the age of 15 years. (4) The conduct took place in the context of 
and was associated with an armed conflict not of an international character. (5) The 
perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed 
conflict.’ – SCSL (Trial Chamber II), judgment of 20 June 2007 para 731 mistakenly cites the 
elements of crimes for Art 8(2)(b)(xxvi) ICC Statute, which deal with the crime in the context 
of an international armed conflict, see Meisenberg S (2008) 147. 
162 Prosecutor v Fofana & Kondewa, SCSL (Appeals Chamber), judgment of 28 May 2008 
para 139; SCSL (Trial Chamber II), judgment of 20 June 2007 para 733. 
163 SCSL (Trial Chamber I), judgment of 2 August 2007 para 192; SCSL (Trial Chamber II), 
judgment of 20 June 2007 para 735. See also SCSL (Appeals Chamber), judgment of 28 May 
2008, separate opinion Winter para 11 n 1207; Breitegger A (2010) 721; Meisenberg S (2008) 
148; Werle G (2009) para 1140. However, the distinction between ‘conscripting’ and 
‘enlisting’ arguably remains relevant for sentencing, see Graf R ‘The International Criminal 
Court and Child Soldiers, An Appraisal of the Lubanga Judgment’ (2012) 10 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 956-7. 
164 SCSL (Trial Chamber II), judgment of 20 June 2007 para 734. 
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participation, a term used in numerous international humanitarian law instruments.165 
The terminological issue was relevant due to the fact that ‘direct participation’ relates 
to the fundamental principle of distinction between combatants and civilians and 
entails the loss of the protected civilian status.166 In the context of international 
humanitarian law, ‘direct participation’ was thus interpreted narrowly in order to 
afford wide protection to civilians. 167  However, in the context of international 
criminal law, an extensive interpretation of ‘active’ participation was desirable with 
regard to the protective scope of the war crime of using child soldiers.168  
Referring to a footnote in the Preparatory Committee’s ICC Draft Statute of 1998,169 
the SCSL concluded that ‘active participation’ in this context included ‘direct 
participation in combat’ as well as ‘active participation in activities linked to 
combat’.170 Thus, the SCSL took an extensive approach, understanding ‘active’ 
participation more broadly than ‘direct’ participation in the context of international 
humanitarian law.171 Moreover, the SCSL stated that active participation of children 
in hostilities encompassed putting their lives at risk,172 and explained that this was not 
limited to direct participation in combat, but could also be the case with respect to 
logistical and other supportive activities.173 
                                                
165 Art 51(3) AP I, Art 13(3) AP II, Art 4(1) AP II. 
166 Art 51(3) AP I; Art 13(3) AP II, Art 4(1) AP II; Art 43(2) AP I; Art 67(e) AP I. See also 
Graf R (2012) 961. 
167 Graf R (2012) 961. 
168 Breitegger A (2010) 722; Meisenberg S (2008) 149. 
169 UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court, Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, Draft Statute for the International Criminal Court, UN Doc. 
A/CONF.183/2/Add.1 of 14 April 1998, 21 n 12. 
170 SCSL (Trial Chamber II), judgment of 20 June 2007 para 736; Prosecutor v Sesay, Kallon 
& Gbao, SCSL (Trial Chamber I), judgment of 25 February 2009 para 188. 
171 SCSL (Trial Chamber I), judgment of 25 February 2009 para 1723. See also Breitegger A 
(2010) 722; Graf R (2012) 964; Meisenberg S (2008) 149.  
172 SCSL (Trial Chamber II), judgment of 20 June 2007 para 736. 
173 SCSL (Trial Chamber II), judgment of 20 June 2007 para 737. 
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In its Lubanga judgment,174 the ICC was concerned with many of the issues that were 
dealt with before the SCSL regarding the recruitment and use of child soldiers. 
Having considered that the relevant provisions in the SCSL and ICC Statutes were 
identical, the ICC expressly identified the potential utility of the SCSL jurisprudence 
in interpreting the relevant provisions of the Rome Statute.175 Subsequently, the ICC 
drew upon the findings of the SCSL, inter alia, regarding the conception of 
compulsion as the distinguishing element between conscription and enlistment176 and 
the role of consent.177 Moreover, likewise referring to the aforementioned report of 
the Preparatory Commission as well as the pertinent SCSL case law, the ICC also 
took an extensive approach as to the notion of ‘active’ participation in hostilities. 
Notably, the ICC made out the decisive element of active participation (be it ‘direct’ 
or ‘indirect’) to be the exposure of the child to danger as a potential target.178 This 
may arguably be considered only terminologically different from the constitutive 
element according to the SCSL jurisprudence, namely that the activity encompasses 
putting the life of the child at risk.179  
The jurisprudence of the SCSL was certainly not essential to many of the ICC’s 
findings. The genesis of the ICC Statute, its elements of crimes as well as established 
customary international law may well have led the ICC to the same conclusions in the 
absence of the SCSL jurisprudence. Yet the ICC’s intensive scrutiny of the SCSL 
case law and the concurrent findings are striking.  
                                                
174 Prosecutor v Lubanga, ICC (Trial Chamber I), judgment of 14 March 2012. 
175 ICC (Trial Chamber I), judgment of 14 March 2012 para 603. 
176 ICC (Trial Chamber I), judgment of 14 March 2012 para 607-8. 
177 ICC (Trial Chamber I), judgment of 14 March 2012 para 616. 
178 ICC (Trial Chamber I), judgment of 14 March 2012 para 628. 
179 See above 36. 
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Moreover, the fact that the SCSL for its part based many of its findings on the ICC 
Statute and the pertinent elements of crimes is a consolidating contribution in itself. 
The resulting coherences between the two courts’ jurisprudence regarding child 
soldiers can thus be considered exemplary for a positive ‘cross-fertilisation’180 
between hybrid courts and the ICC. 
4.4.1.2 Attacks on peacekeeping missions 
The war crime of attacks on peacekeeping missions is included in Article 4(b) of the 
SCSL Statute, which corresponds verbatim to Article 8(2)(b)(iii) and (e)(iii) of the 
ICC Statute. As with the recruitment and use of child soldiers, the SCSL found that 
the offence existed as a crime under customary international law at the relevant 
time.181 The actus reus as determined by the SCSL again essentially corresponds to 
the elements of crimes for the respective provision under the ICC Statute,182 though 
the SCSL did not expressly refer to the latter.  
As to the notion of a ‘peacekeeping mission’, the court made out three constitutive 
elements, namely the consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force except 
in self-defence and defence of the mandate.183 As concerns the latter element, the 
SCSL noted that peacekeeping missions needed to be distinguished from measures 
                                                
180 Benzing M & Bergsmo M in Romano CPR, Nollkaemper A & Kleffner JK (2005) 413. 
See also Dickinson LA (2003) 304 regarding such cross-fertilisation effects across national 
and international levels through hybrid courts in general. 
181 See SCSL (Trial Chamber I), judgment of 25 February 2009 para 213. 
182 See SCSL (Trial Chamber I), judgment of 25 February 2009 para 219, namely: ‘(i) The 
Accused directed an attack against personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles 
involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter 
of the United Nations; (ii) The Accused intended such personnel, installations, material, units 
or vehicles to be the object of the attack; (iii) Such personnel, installations, material, units or 
vehicles were entitled to that protection given to civilians or civilian objects under the 
international law of armed conflict; and (iv) The Accused knew or had reason to know that 
the personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles were protected.’ See also elements of 
crimes for Art 8(2)(b)(iii), (e)(iii) ICC Statute. 
183 SCSL (Trial Chamber I), judgment of 25 February 2009 para 225. 
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under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 184  The SCSL considered the crime a 
particularisation of the general prohibition of attacks against civilians and civilian 
objects in international humanitarian law.185 Thus, the respective personnel or objects 
needed to be entitled to protection given to civilians and civilian objects under 
international humanitarian law.186 This necessitated a differentiation between self-
defence and direct participation in hostilities.187 In this regard, the SCSL implied that 
the formal legal basis, such as a UN mandate under Chapter VI of the UN Charter as 
opposed to a Chapter VII mandate, was not decisive.188 Rather, it stated that the 
entirety of circumstances should be taken into account, including the practices 
actually adopted by the peacekeeping mission during the conflict.189 
The ICC was concerned with attacks on peacekeeping missions in its decision on the 
confirmation of charges in the Abu Garda case.190 Here, too, the ICC followed the 
SCSL in all relevant aspects. This included, in particular, the three constitutive 
elements of a peacekeeping mission, 191  the necessity to distinguish these from 
Chapter VII measures,192 as well as the factual (as opposed to formal) criteria 
developed by the SCSL regarding self-defence vis-à-vis direct participation in 
hostilities.193  
 
 
                                                
184 SCSL (Trial Chamber I), judgment of 25 February 2009 para 230. 
185 SCSL (Trial Chamber I), judgment of 25 February 2009 para 215. 
186 SCSL (Trial Chamber I), judgment of 25 February 2009 para 233-4.  
187 See also above 35-6; Breitegger A (2010) 718. 
188 Breitegger A (2010) 719. 
189 SCSL (Trial Chamber I), judgment of 25 February 2009 para 234. 
190 Prosecutor v Abu Garda, ICC (Pre-Trial Chamber I), decision of 8 February 2010. 
191 ICC (Pre-Trial Chamber I), decision of 8 February 2010 para 71. 
192 ICC (Pre-Trial Chamber I), decision of 8 February 2010 para 71. 
193 ICC (Pre-Trial Chamber I), decision of 8 February 2010 para 80, expressly referring to 
SCSL (Trial Chamber I), judgment of 25 February 2009 para 234. 
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4.4.1.3 Internationalisation of an internal armed conflict 
The existence of an armed conflict in Sierra Leone from 1991 to 2002 had been 
established by the SCSL early on.194 However, following a defence motion in the 
RUF case, the SCSL had to adjudicate on the question of the Sierra Leonean civil 
war’s classification as an international or non-international armed conflict. It was 
argued by the defence that the SCSL had jurisdiction only over war crimes committed 
in non-international armed conflict, whereas the Sierra Leonean conflict was 
international due to the involvement of ECOMOG and UNAMSIL troops.  
The SCSL relied on the UN ad hoc tribunals’ jurisprudence in ascertaining that the 
distinction between international and non-international armed conflict had been 
overcome regarding the war crimes entailed in the SCSL Statute, while conceding that 
the drafters of the SCSL Statute indeed had a non-international armed conflict in 
mind. 195  Moreover, it applied the ICTY’s Tadić criteria with respect to the 
internationalisation of an internal conflict due to the ‘overall control’ over one of the 
belligerent parties by another state.196 The SCSL eventually held that the conflict at 
hand was non-international, since the alleged influence of Charles Taylor’s Liberia 
did not amount to overall control over the RUF, and that the involvement of 
UNAMSIL and ECOMOG troops could not be classified as armed violence between 
two states.197  
                                                
194 SCSL (Trial Chamber I), judgment of 2 August 2007 para 696; SCSL (Trial Chamber II), 
judgment of 20 June 2007 para 258. 
195 SCSL (Appeals Chamber), decision of 25 May 2004 paras 19, 25.  
196 See SCSL (Trial Chamber II), judgment of 20 June 2007 para 251; ICTY (Appeals 
Chamber), decision of 2 October 1995 paras 131, 137. The SCSL thereby adopted the ICTY’s 
position regarding the so-called ‘Nicaragua-Tadić controversy’, see Breitegger A (2010) 716-
17 with further references. 
197 SCSL (Trial Chamber II), judgment of 20 June 2007 para 251; SCSL (Trial Chamber I), 
judgment of 25 February 2009 paras 973, 976. This finding was considered another 
significant contribution concerning the internationalisation of armed conflicts, see 
Breitegger A (2010) 716 for details. 
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4.4.1.4 Participation in a ‘joint criminal enterprise’ 
The SCSL also followed the ICTY and ICTR case law regarding the modes of 
liability and in particular applied the ‘joint criminal enterprise’ (JCE) doctrine.198 This 
concept had been developed by the ICTY as a form of primary criminal liability and 
entails a ‘basic’ (JCE I), a ‘systemic’ (JCE II) and an ‘extended’ form (JCE III). 199 
The mens rea requirements of the three forms differ, and especially those of JCE III 
are controversial.200 Moreover, the entire concept of JCE is unlikely to be applied by 
the ICC, which has stated on several occasions that the comprehensive provisions on 
individual criminal responsibility in the ICC Statute do not provide for the application 
of the JCE doctrine.201 For these reasons, the future of this model of individual 
criminal responsibility is rather uncertain. Thus, it is doubtful whether its application 
by the SCSL constitutes a positive contribution, even though it reaffirmed the case 
law of the UN ad hoc tribunals.  
Notably, however, several SCSL judges had reservations in particular with respect to 
the application of the JCE III variant.202 Moreover, it must be borne in mind not only 
that the SCSL Statute follows the ICTY and ICTR Statutes regarding individual 
criminal responsibility, but also that it specifically provides that the court should be 
                                                
198 See, e.g., Prosecutor v Brima, Kamara & Kanu, SCSL (Appeals Chamber), judgment of 
22 February 2008 para 72; SCSL (Trial Chamber II), judgment of 20 June 2007 para 61; 
SCSL (Trial Chamber I), judgment of 2 August 2007 para 206; SCSL (Trial Chamber I), 
judgment of 25 February 2009 para 251.  
199 For details, see ICTY (Appeals Chamber), judgment of 15 July 1999 paras 227-8. 
200 See also below 43. 
201 See Prosecutor v Katanga & Ngudjolo Chui, ICC (Pre-Trial Chamber), decision of 
30 September 2008 para 508; Prosecutor v Lubanga, ICC (Pre-Trial Chamber), decision of 
29 January 2007 para 326. 
202 SCSL (Trial Chamber I), judgment of 2 August 2007, separate opinion Thompson; 
Prosecutor v Sesay, Kallon & Gbao, SCSL (Appeals Chamber), judgment of 26 October 2009 
separate opinion Fisher para 18. 
 
 
 
 
 44 
guided by pertinent ICTY and ICTR jurisprudence.203 Thus, the SCSL’s application 
of the JCE doctrine is ultimately not surprising.204 
4.4.1.5 Conclusions 
The SCSL’s contributions to the development of substantive international criminal 
law have been considerable. In particular, its decisions concerning the recruitment and 
use of child soldiers and attacks on peacekeeping missions have rightly been 
welcomed.205 Moreover, the reciprocal use of sources and decisions between the 
SCSL and the ICC regarding the interpretation of these crimes is noteworthy. Indeed, 
this shows the possibility of a positive relationship between hybrid courts and the ICC 
regarding the further development of international criminal law.  
In other areas, the SCSL affirmed established case law of the UN ad hoc tribunals and 
thus did not cause a fragmentation of substantive international criminal law. While 
this arguably had a consolidating and thus strengthening effect as far as the 
internationalisation of an armed conflict is concerned, the same is not necessarily true 
regarding the application of the JCE doctrine. However, it is doubtful whether the 
SCSL could have been expected to depart from the relevant ICTY and ICTR case law 
in this regard. 
4.4.2  Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 
However, the JCE doctrine was dealt with rather differently before the ECCC. While 
the SCSL, not unlike other hybrid courts,206 applied the JCE doctrine without much 
hesitation, the ECCC were the first criminal tribunal other than the ICTY and the 
                                                
203 Arts 14, 20 SCSL Statute. 
204 See also Schomburg W (2010) 24. 
205 Breitegger A (2012) 725 (‘groundbreaking’); Meisenberg S (2008) 143. 
206 See also Prosecutor v Perreira, SPSC, judgment of 27 April 2005 para 206. 
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ICTR to engage in detailed deliberations on the genesis of this mode of liability, 
especially regarding JCE III.207 
4.4.2.1 Participation in a ‘joint criminal enterprise’ 
According to the ad hoc tribunals’ jurisprudence concerning JCE III, a person may be 
criminally liable for acts committed by other members of a joint criminal enterprise 
that exceed the framework of the common plan, as long as such acts have been 
foreseeable.208 The application of JCE III by the ad hoc tribunals drew considerable 
criticism especially for two reasons in particular. First, its basis in customary 
international law was questioned.209 Secondly, it was stated that it violated the 
principle of individual guilt, since the perpetrator need not necessarily fulfil the mens 
rea of the crime in question.210  
Following an appeal to a decision by the ECCC’s Office of the Co-Investigating 
Judge in which all forms of JCE had been found to be applicable in principle, the 
ECCC’s Pre-Trial Chamber had to determine whether individual criminal liability as 
provided for by the JCE doctrine had existed in international law before 1974.211 In 
this regard it scrutinised, in particular, the derivation of JCE from customary 
                                                
207 Berster LC ‘Entscheidungsanmerkung – ECCC (Pre-Trial Chamber), Beschl. v. 20.5.2010’ 
(2010) Zeitschrift für Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik 538. 
208 ICTY (Appeals Chamber), judgment of 15 July 1999 paras 204, 228. 
209 See, e.g., Ambos K ‘Joint Criminal Enterprise and Command Responsibility’ (2007) 5 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 173; Bogdan A ‘Individual Criminal Responsibility 
in the Execution of a “Joint Criminal Enterprise” in the Jurisprudence of the ad hoc 
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’ (2006) 6 International Criminal Law 
Review 109. – For the ICTY’s derivation of JCE from customary international law, see ICTY 
(Appeals Chamber), judgment of 15 July 1999 paras 194-219. 
210 See, e.g., Ambos K Der Allgemeine Teil des Völkerstrafrechts 2 ed (2004) 557; Olásolo H 
‘Reflections on the Treatment of the Notions of Control of the Crime and Joint Criminal 
Enterprise in the Stakić Appeals Judgment’ (2007) 7 International Criminal Law Review  
157-8. See also Prosecutor v Martić, ICTY (Appeals Chamber), judgment of 8 October 2008, 
separate opinion Schomburg para 7. 
211 Decision on the Appeals Against the Co-Investigative Judges Order on Joint Criminal 
Enterprise (JCE), ECCC (Pre-Trial Chamber), decision of 20 May 2010. 
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international law in the relevant ICTY jurisprudence.212 Remarkably, the ECCC’s 
Pre-Trial Chamber found that JCE III did not have a sufficiently firm basis in 
customary international law at the relevant time.213 While the ICTY had derived the 
JCE doctrine especially from several post-World War II decisions by national courts 
in Europe,214 the ECCC found that no conviction in any of these cases was expressly 
or impliedly based on the JCE III elements.215 The ECCC did not elaborate on the 
aforementioned criticism regarding an alleged violation of the principle of individual 
guilt in the context of JCE III. However, after discussing the relevant authorities,216 it 
stated that the JCE I and JCE II variants had been firmly established under customary 
international law at the relevant time.217 The ECCC’s Trial Chamber subsequently 
concurred with these considerations.218 
4.4.2.2 Conclusions 
While the ICC is highly unlikely to apply the JCE doctrine,219 the ECCC’s findings 
regarding JCE may influence how other international or internationalised courts deal 
with this mode of liability.220 Though not entirely in line with ICTY and ICTR case 
law, the ECCC’s conclusions largely correspond to the arguably predominant 
scholarly opinion, as well as that of several judges of international and 
                                                
212 ECCC (Pre-Trial Chamber), decision of 20 May 2010 paras 75-86. 
213 ECCC (Pre-Trial Chamber), decision of 20 May 2010 paras 77, 83. 
214 ICTY (Appeals Chamber), judgment of 15 July 1999 paras 194-219. 
215 ECCC (Pre-Trial Chamber), decision of 20 May 2010 paras 77, 83. 
216 ECCC (Pre-Trial Chamber), decision of 20 May 2010 paras 59-69.  
217 ECCC (Pre-Trial Chamber), decision of 20 May 2010 para 72. 
218 Decision on the Applicability of Joint Criminal Enterprise, ECCC (Trial Chamber), 
decision of 12 September 2011 paras 32-4. For the STL’s deliberations on JCE and the 
ECCC’s assessment thereof in this decision, see below 48-50. 
219 See above 41; ICC (Pre-Trial Chamber), decision of 30 September 2008 para 508; ICC 
(Pre-Trial Chamber), decision of 29 January 2007 para 326. 
220 Berster LC (2010) 538.  
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internationalised courts.221 Accordingly, the decision was in fact rightly welcomed 
and lauded especially for its thorough analysis of the relevant case law.222 To the 
contrary, with regard to the other forms of JCE, it was even suggested that the ECCC 
missed a chance of terminological clarification by not adhering to the term 
‘commission’ and abandoning the ‘joint criminal enterprise’ label altogether.223 Yet, 
the decision was praised for allowing for the necessary harmonisation of modes of 
liability in international criminal law, though a further approximation to the ICC 
Statute’s language in interpreting ‘joint commission’ was considered desirable.224 
Ultimately, thus, despite its prima facie fragmenting effect due to the deviation from 
the settled case law of the ICTY and ICTR, the ECCC’s deliberations arguably had a 
positive effect on the development of international criminal law. 
4.4.3 Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
As previously mentioned, in principle, the STL will only apply domestic criminal law. 
However, its relevance for this study arises from the fact that the STL’s Appeals 
Chamber, in an interlocutory decision,225 took recourse to and discussed international 
criminal law.  
4.4.3.1 Terrorism as a crime under international law 
The STL was established primarily to prosecute the perpetrators of a terrorist act, 
namely the assassination of Rafiq Hariri. Since Article 2 of the STL Statutes provides 
for the application of domestic criminal law, the key provision before the STL in this 
                                                
221 See above 43 nn 207-8; ICTY (Appeals Chamber), judgment of 8 October 2008, separate 
opinion Schomburg; SCSL (Trial Chamber I), judgment of 2 August 2007, separate opinion 
Thompson; SCSL (Appeals Chamber), judgment of 26 October 2009, separate opinion Fisher. 
222 Karnavas MG ‘Joint Criminal Enterprise at the ECCC: A Critical Analysis of the Pre-Trial 
Chamber’s Decision Against the Application of JCE III and Two Divergent Commentaries on 
the Same’ (2010) 21 Criminal Law Forum 448; Schomburg W (2010) 28. 
223 Schomburg W (2010) 27-8. 
224 Schomburg W (2010) 28. 
225 STL (Appeals Chamber), decision of 16 February 2011. 
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regard is Section 314 of the Lebanese Criminal Code, which criminalises terrorism. 
However, in answering several questions posed by the STL’s pre-trial judge,226 the 
STL’s Appeals Chamber addressed the question of whether international criminal law 
should be taken into account in interpreting the relevant provisions of the Lebanese 
Criminal Code, and how this would affect their interpretation. 
The STL first noted that internationally established criminal tribunals could only 
apply domestic law that is not in conflict with international law.227 In this regard, 
international law may operate as a corrective to avoid ‘unreasonable’ or ‘manifestly 
unjust’ results. 228  However, despite not finding the domestic provision to be 
unreasonable or unjust, the STL found that international law should be taken into 
account as an interpretative aid nonetheless.229 In the STL’s view, this was justified 
because of the international dimension of the allegations falling under the STL’s 
jurisdiction, which the UN Security Council classified as ‘threats to international 
peace and security’.230  
Subsequently, the STL undertook a comprehensive discussion of international 
treaties, national laws, decisions by national courts, and UN resolutions relating to 
terrorism and its status under customary international law. In particular, the STL came 
                                                
226 The decision was issued pursuant to Rule 68(G) of the STL’s Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence. The judge-made rule was introduced one week before the decision at hand and 
enabled the pre-trial judge to pose preliminary questions to the Appeals Chamber. It may 
have been created ultra vires given the functions of the Appeals Chamber set forth in 
Art 26(2) STL Statute and thus the separation of responsibility between the Trial Chamber 
and Appeals Chamber, see Gillett M & Schuster M ‘Fast-track Justice, The Special Tribunal 
for Lebanon Defines Terrorism’ (2011) 9 Journal of International Criminal Justice 992-3. 
227 STL (Appeals Chamber), decision of 16 February 2011 para 39. See also Ambos K 
‘Judicial Creativity at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon: Is There a Crime of Terrorism under 
International Law?’ (2011) 24 Leiden Journal of International Law (hereafter ‘Judicial 
Creativity at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’) 657 with further references. 
228 Ambos K ‘Judicial Creativity at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’ (2011) 657. 
229 STL (Appeals Chamber), decision of 16 February 2011 paras 81-2, 123-4. 
230 STL (Appeals Chamber), decision of 16 February 2011 para 124. 
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to the conclusion that there was a crime of transnational terrorism under customary 
international law, the elements of which it deduced from the analysed sources.231  
These findings were criticised with remarkable vehemence.232 Apart from the dubious 
procedural circumstances surrounding the decision,233  commentators pointed out 
several methodological deficiencies. According to some authors, the STL failed to 
properly recognise and address the distinction between a proscription under 
international law on the one hand, and individual criminal responsibility under 
international law on the other.234 Moreover, the STL’s very recourse to international 
law was questioned,235 given that the Lebanese terrorism provision as interpreted in 
the Lebanese courts was sufficiently clear and neither unreasonable nor unjust.236 
In particular, however, the derivation of the definition of terrorism and the conclusion 
that transnational terrorism constituted a crime under international law was rejected. 
In fact, it was suggested that the STL had ‘misinterpreted, exaggerated or erroneously 
                                                
231 STL (Appeals Chamber), decision of 16 February 2011 paras 85-6, 88-100, 102. The STL 
finds the elements of the crime to be ‘(i) the perpetration of a criminal act (such as murder, 
kidnapping, hostage-taking, arson, and so on), or threatening such an act; (ii) the intent to 
spread fear among the population (which would generally entail the creation of public danger) 
or directly or indirectly coerce a national or international authority to take some action, or to 
refrain from taking it; (iii) when the act involves a transnational element’ (para 85). For a 
critical discussion of the derivation from customary international law see Saul B ‘Legislating 
from a Radical Hague: The United Nations Special Tribunal for Lebanon Invents an 
International Crime of Transnational Terrorism’ (2011) 24 Leiden Journal of International 
Law 681-99. 
232 See, e.g., Kirsch S & Oehmichen A ‘Die Erfindung von “Terrorismus” als 
Völkerrechtsverbrechen durch den Sondergerichtshof für den Libanon’ (2011) Zeitschrift für 
Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik 805-7 (‘scandalous’, ‘disastrous’, ‘[must be] decidedly 
rejected’); Saul B (2011) 670 (‘fatally incorrect’), 699 (‘poor reasons and loose 
methodology’, ‘badly misjudged [the available sources]’). 
233 It was suggested that the rule was introduced with the single purpose to render the decision 
at hand and its findings on terrorism, see Kirsch S & Oehmichen A (2011) 803, 806. 
234 Ambos K ‘Judicial Creativity at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’ (2011) 665; Kirsch S & 
Oehmichen A (2011) 805. 
235 Ambos K‘Judicial Creativity at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’ (2011) 656 (‘essentially 
obiter’); Gillett M & Schuster M (2011) 1006; Kirsch S & Oehmichen A (2011) 802-3, 805. 
236 Ambos K ‘Judicial Creativity at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’ (2011) 664; Gillett M 
& Schuster M (2011) 998-9, 1006; Kirsch S & Oehmichen A (2011) 805. 
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applied’ every source it relied upon.237 Rather, the respective sources were at best 
considered efforts to reach an international consensus on the definition of terrorism, 
while precisely verifying that these had so far been fruitless.238 Moreover, the STL’s 
definition was not considered a helpful contribution to this discourse either – at least 
as far as a definition of terrorism as a criminal offence was concerned – because its 
actus reus lacked precision.239 Furthermore, the STL was criticised for not showing 
proper judicial restraint, accused of exceeding the bounds of the judicial function and 
assuming a quasi-legislative role.240  
4.4.3.2 Participation in a ‘joint criminal enterprise’ 
Regarding the applicable modes of criminal liability, the pre-trial judge moreover 
asked the Appeals Chamber whether reference should be made to domestic law, 
international law, or both.241 This question arose due to the aforementioned ambiguity 
caused by the inclusion of Article 3 of the STL Statute.242 While the Appeals 
Chamber found that, in principle, the modes of liability under Lebanese criminal law 
should be applied,243 it embarked on an extensive discussion of international criminal 
law concerning individual criminal responsibility. In this context the STL reaffirmed 
the JCE doctrine, and especially defended its extended form (JCE III) and its basis in 
customary international law.244 The STL took notice of the previously discussed 
ECCC decision in which the foundation of JCE III in customary international law was 
                                                
237 Saul B (2011) 679. 
238 See Ambos K ‘Judicial Creativity at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’ (2011) 675; 
Kirsch S & Oehmichen A (2011) 803-5. 
239 Ambos K ‘Judicial Creativity at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’ (2011) 675; Kirsch S & 
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negated. However, in a footnote, it dismissed the ECCC decision by referring to the 
divergent scope of temporal jurisdiction of the two courts, stating that the STL had to 
consider jurisprudence from the 1990s, which was irrelevant to the ECCC with regard 
to its temporal jurisdiction.245 
This line of argument was criticised due to the fact that the ICTY, in its Tadić 
decision, had relied on post-World War II jurisprudence as the alleged foundation of 
JCE in customary international law.246 Moreover, notwithstanding the relevant ICTY 
and ICTR case law, the same is true with regard to additional authorities the STL 
cited in the decision at hand.247 Since the alleged basis of JCE in customary 
international law was thus equally relevant to the ECCC’s temporal jurisdiction, the 
STL’s reasoning was considered to be rather specious.248  
Notably, in a subsequent decision, the ECCC’s Trial Chamber upheld the assessment 
of the Pre-Trial Chamber that JCE III was not part of customary international law at 
the relevant time, and found that the additional authorities relied upon by the STL did 
not support a different conclusion.249  
4.4.3.3 Conclusions 
The STL’s decision is problematic especially regarding its conclusion that 
transnational terrorism is a crime under customary international law. In particular, it is 
unfortunate as it is likely to be cited as authority for the proposition that such a crime 
exists.250 Given that the predominant opinion hitherto denied that terrorism was a 
                                                
245 STL (Appeals Chamber), decision of 16 February 2011 para 239 n 360. 
246 See above 44 n 212. 
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crime under international law,251 this finding can be considered an instance of a 
considerable deviation from the previous state of international criminal law. As 
opposed to an incremental and cautious further development of international criminal 
law (such as the SCSL jurisprudence regarding the interpretation of previously 
existing war crimes), it formulates an entirely new crime in a methodologically highly 
questionable way.252 Accordingly, the impact of this decision is rather more adverse 
than a mere deviation from the settled case law of international criminal courts. 
Moreover, apart from substantive legal issues, the STL’s findings may have negative 
effects on public confidence in international criminal justice institutions and the 
professionalism of their judges.253  
The affirmation of the JCE doctrine, on the other hand, confirmed the settled case law 
of the ICTY and the ICTR. However, as already discussed regarding the relevant 
SCSL and ECCC jurisprudence,254 it is doubtful whether the affirmation of the JCE 
doctrine has had a positive impact on international criminal law. Yet, the STL’s 
decision is noteworthy in this regard considering its relation to the ECCC decisions on 
JCE III. While the STL dismissed the ECCC’s Pre-Trial Chamber decision, the 
ECCC’s Trial Chamber subsequently upheld the proposition that JCE III was not part 
of customary international law in 1974.255 Irrespective of whether it is more desirable 
to confirm or renounce the JCE doctrine and especially JCE III, the interplay of these 
decisions is certainly an example of a fragmentation of substantive international 
criminal law caused by hybrid courts.  
                                                
251 See, e.g., Saul B (2011) 678. However, it was considered that terrorist acts could amount 
to crimes against humanity or war crimes, see Werle G (2009) para 85 with further 
references. 
252 Gillett M & Schuster M (2011) 993, 999; Kirsch S & Oehmichen A (2011) 806; Saul B 
(2011) 678.  
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CHAPTER 5:  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
It has been shown in the beginning that hybrid courts offer numerous advantages over 
purely international or purely national criminal courts. This is especially true 
regarding their impact on a transitional society coming to terms with large-scale 
atrocities committed in its past. While international tribunals run the risk of being 
perceived as interference from outside, the national justice system might lack the 
independence an impartiality to adequately carry out prosecutions. However, the 
combination of international and national elements may promote the perception of 
criminal trials as being legitimate and impartial. Moreover, while national 
involvement is essential to a perception of ownership and local capacity building, the 
domestic criminal justice system of a post-conflict state is often unprepared to carry 
out prosecutions without international help. For these reasons, the establishment of 
hybrid courts is a viable option for a transitional state to prosecute perpetrators of 
serious crimes. It has moreover been discussed that neither the deficiencies of former 
hybrid courts nor the creation of the ICC necessarily render the establishment of 
future hybrid courts undesirable or obsolete. It is thus to be expected that more hybrid 
courts will be established in the future. Moreover, considering their position within 
the international legal system, hybrid courts could play a significant role as regards 
the development of international criminal law in the near future.  
Whether the proliferation of hybrid courts is a positive or a negative development 
depends to a considerable extent on whether they have a strengthening or weakening 
impact on substantive international criminal law. Regarding this question, the study 
had contradictory findings.  
The legal bases of hybrid courts ultimately cannot be said to cause an adverse 
diversification of international criminal law, despite many of them exhibiting a certain 
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degree of eclecticism when it comes to the inclusion of international criminal law. 
Deviations from established international criminal law have been shown to be 
relatively slight and restrictive. Thus, they rather illustrate the flexibility of hybrid 
courts in adapting to the particularities of a given conflict. 
However, the jurisprudence discussed in this study arguably had both positive and 
negative effects on the development of substantive international criminal law. In 
particular, the STL’s heavily criticised terrorism decision can be considered 
exemplary of the potential negative impact of hybrid courts on international criminal 
law. On the other hand, the interpretation of certain war crimes by the SCSL is 
certainly a positive contribution, which has influenced the case law of the ICC and 
has been well received by commentators. The same can be said of its affirmation of 
ICTY and ICTR case law relating to the law of armed conflict. However, the effect of 
the application of the ‘joint criminal enterprise’ doctrine, despite its prima facie 
consolidating effect, is debatable. Indeed, it is rather the – diversifying – ECCC 
jurisprudence that should be welcomed in this respect. This moreover shows that 
deviation from previous international case law by hybrid courts cannot per se be 
equated to a negative impact on international criminal law.  
In the context of the scope of this study, it is furthermore indicated to consider two 
further questions relating to the future use of hybrid courts.  
The first is whether these findings allow for any conclusions regarding the 
preferability of certain hybrid court models over others. As previously mentioned,256 
certain tendencies regarding the structural features of hybrid courts are observable. 
These include their establishment by a state in co-operation with an international 
                                                
256 See above 11-12. 
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organisation, their centralised integration into the domestic court system, location in 
the commission state, and mixed composition. However, with regard to the future use 
of hybrid courts, the question arises whether these characteristics relate in any way to 
the possible consolidating or diversifying effects of a given hybrid court’s 
jurisprudence. A particularly interesting issue in this regard is the possible coherence 
between, on the one hand, the legal position taken within a hybrid court’s 
jurisprudence in relation to the previous state of international criminal law, and, on 
the other hand, the degree of its internationalisation.  
The findings of this study do not entail a clear answer to this question. The SCSL, 
whose case law has largely had a positive effect on international criminal law, does 
feature numerous international and only few national elements. However, this 
coherence does not pertain with regard to the STL and the ECCC. The STL has 
numerous elements that make it akin to a purely international court: It was created by 
the UN Security Council, features renowned international judges, 257  and is 
geographically removed from the state in which the crimes have been committed. 
However, its decision on the crime of terrorism has been widely rejected and has 
arguably had a negative impact on international criminal law. The ECCC, on the other 
hand, are entirely integrated into the domestic court system, have initially been 
created domestically and feature a majority of national judges. Yet their deliberations 
on JCE have widely been lauded and should be considered a positive contribution to 
the development of substantive international criminal law. Remarkably, thus, it must 
be concluded – within the scope of this study – that a higher degree of 
internationalisation does not necessarily entail positive implications of the 
jurisprudence of a given hybrid court. Rather, the positive or negative effects seem to 
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depend on the extent to which the legal basis of a hybrid court adequately reflects 
existing international criminal law, as well as on methodological accuracy and proper 
consciousness of the judicial function on the part of its judges. 
The second issue regarding the future use of hybrid courts is how to counteract the 
diversification of international criminal law by hybrid courts. The different 
approaches to the ‘joint criminal enterprise’ doctrine in the jurisprudence discussed in 
this paper show that hybrid courts can indeed have a fragmenting effect on 
international criminal law. Irrespective of whether this should be welcomed or 
rejected regarding the specific legal issue at hand, one cannot deny that a uniform 
application of substantive international criminal law is desirable with regard to the 
future. One possibility to achieve such uniformity across international courts and a 
plurality of hybrid courts is to provide for a common appellate body. An option could 
be the cooperation of future hybrid courts with the ICC in this regard.258 However, 
this could in turn be problematic, as hybrid courts may be established precisely in 
order to avoid the involvement of a purely international court.  
A preferable step could be the development of a model statute for internationalised 
courts.259 Certainly, this should not curtail the flexibility offered by the numerous 
models of hybrid courts regarding their composition, the degree of their integration 
into the domestic system, and the applicable law. However, concerning the inclusion 
of substantive international criminal law, it seems sensible to provide for a 
standardised codification of general principles and crimes under international law. 
                                                
258 See Meisenberg S Rezension: Philipp Ambach: Eine Rahmenkonvention für die Errichtung 
hybrider internationaler Strafgerichte als Mittel zur Garantie moderner 
Völkerrechtsstandards im Rahmen zukünftiger Ad-hoc-Strafgerichtsbarkeit für 
Völkerrechtsverbrechen (22 September 2011) available at http://www.friedens-
warte.de/de/rezensionen/168-rezmeisenberg20110922.html (accessed 25 October 2013). 
259 For the proposal of such a framework, see Ambach P (2011). 
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This should moreover be based on the ICC Statute,260 as this would allow for further 
harmonisation and reciprocal utility of hybrid court and ICC jurisprudence. In this 
way, the existence of a model statute could significantly counteract the diversification 
of international criminal law by hybrid courts and promote their positive effects on its 
further development. 
 
                                                
260 See also, e.g., Njikam O, Pirmurat S & Stegmiller I (2008) 432. 
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